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I. INTRODUCTION
As Justice Jackson described it in 1945, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause' is "relatively a neglected one in legal literature."2 The De-
fense of Marriage Act of 19963 (DOMA), however, has generated new
interest in the Full Faith and Credit Clause; William Eskridge
predicts that it "is about to become the Constitution's hottest provi-
sion."4 Whereas the Clause requires states to give full faith and credit
to the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of other states, DOMA
permits states to deny full faith and credit to acts, records, and judi-
cial proceedings that recognize same-sex marriages. 5 DOMA is a
novel use of Congress' power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause:6
1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
2. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1945). The nature and scope of Congress' power
under the Clause is overlooked, especially by scholars who instead address Con-
gress' power in the context of conflict of laws jurisprudence. Id. at 3.
3. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1738C & 1 U.S.C. § 7).
4. William Eskridge, Credit is Due (Same Sex Marriage and the U.S. Constitution's
"Full Faith and Credit Clause"), NEw REPuBLic, June 17, 1996, at 11.
5. See infra section H.B.
6. DOMA was passed pursuant to Congress' full faith and credit power. See H.R.
REP. No. 104-664, at 25-26 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.N. 2905, 2929-30
[hereinafter HousE RPoRT]("[This situation presents an appropriate occasion
for invoking our congressional authority under the second sentence of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to enact legislation to prescribe what (if any) effect shall
be given by the States to the public acts, records, or proceedings of other States
relating to homosexual marriage.").
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for the first time in history,7 Congress has exempted one category of
state acts, records, and judicial proceedings from the constitutional
imperative that full faith and credit "shall" be given.
This unprecedented use of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
sparked a lively debate over the scope of Congress' power under the
Clause. When queried regarding the constitutionality of the proposed
bill, several scholars argued DOMA was an improper exercise of the
full faith and credit power because the Clause does not authorize Con-
gress to decrease full faith and credit.8 According to this line of rea-
soning, Congress' power is subject to a "one-way ratchet," which gives
Congress power to expand-but not to contract-full faith and credit. 9
Supporters of DOMA rejected the ratchet theory and instead main-
tained that Congress has broad and expansive power to exempt acts,
records, and judicial proceedings that recognize same-sex marriages
from the full faith and credit obligation.1O
This Article explores whether Congress' full faith and credit power
is indeed subject to a one-way ratchet. In the course of its analysis,
this Article proposes a corollary to the ratchet theory that describes
another dimension to Congress' full faith and credit power: the provi-
sion authorizing Congress to "prescribe the Manner" limits Congress
to legislating only the procedures by which the full faith and credit
mandate will operate. The Article terms this as the "procedures the-
ory."'i According to the procedures theory, Congress has no power to
preempt state substantive law by legislating a particular normative
7. It was not disputed that DOMA was an unprecedented use of Congress' full faith
and credit power. See, e.g., The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on S. 1740
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 69 (1996)[hereinaiter
Hearings 7/1196](statement of Sen. Feinstein)("DOMA permits sister states to
give no effect to the laws of other states. This is a novel approach to legislating
under Congress' full faith and credit enforcement power.").
8. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S5931-32 (daily ed. June 6, 1996)(letter of Prof. Tribe to
Sen. Kennedy, May 24, 1996)[hereinafter Tribe Letter]. See also Laurence H.
Tribe, Toward a Less Perfect Union, N.Y. Tames, May 25, 1996, at 11 [hereinafter
Tribe, Less Perfect Union].
9. Conceiving of congressional power as subject to a one-way ratchet is not new.
The United States Supreme Court noted how Congress' constitutionally derived
power can operate in one direction in the voting rights case, Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Congress may act only "affirmatively" to expand equal
protection rights under the Equal Protection Clause, and Congress has no power
to act "negatively" to restrict rights. See infra section V.
10. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 56-59 (letter of Prof. McConnell to
Sen. Hatch).
11. An example of legislation under the full faith and credit power that conforms to
the procedures theory is the Parental Kidnapping Protection Act (PKPA), 28
U.S.C. § 1738A (1994). PKPA enforces full faith and credit for child custody de-
terminations so long as those determinations are consistent with certain criteria
established by Congress. If a custody determination is made by a court with
proper jurisdiction, that determination will be enforced. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 134-37.
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value; rather, Congress can regulate the means by which state sub-
stantive law shall be given faith and credit. In short, Congress can
administer procedural, but not substantive, regulations when it exer-
cises its full faith and credit power.
Operating in conjunction, the ratchet theory and the procedures
theory suggest that Congress may legislate the procedures by which
full faith and credit shall be given, and in so doing, Congress may leg-
islate only to increase the availability of full faith and credit. The
ratchet theory goes to the meaning of the "Effects Clause," stating that
Congress can legislate to give positive effect to the mandate that "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given." The "procedures theory" goes to the
meaning of the "prescribe the Manner" provision, stating that Con-
gress can legislate the procedures that give content to the imperative
of full faith and credit. Whereas the ratchet theory identifies the per-issible end for which Congress may legislate (to augment full faith
and credit), the procedures theory identifies the permissible means by
which Congress may legislate (to prescribe the procedural manner by
which full faith and credit shall operate).12
Part II investigates the Defense of Marriage Act. The first section
reviews the circumstances leading to the passage of DOMA. The sec-
ond section describes the Act and briefly addresses whether same-sex
marriages might have been recognized had Congress not withdrawn
full faith and credit from acts, records, and judicial proceedings that
recognize same-sex marriages.' 3 The third section outlines the argu-
ments proffered in the debate over whether or not Congress' authority
includes any power to decrease full faith and credit.
Part HI analyzes the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It
investigates the validity of the ratchet theory and the procedures the-
ory as limits on Congress' power and offers the "textual defense" to
both theories.
Part IV considers a "historical/interpretive defense" of the ratchet
and procedures theories. The first section examines the drafting of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to determine whether the drafters
The "procedures theory" is inspired by the Supreme Court's interpretation of
how the Qualifications Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, operates in conjunction
with the Bmes, Places and Manner" provision, U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, and the
"Judge ... Qualifications" provision, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. See infra section V.C.
12. Although the ratchet theory and the procedures theory are related, a flaw in the
procedures theory is not fatal to the ratchet theory. Even if the procedures theory
is wrong, and Congress can legislate substantive norms under its full faith and
credit power, the ratchet theory is not invalidated.
13. This Article neither comprehensively examines, absent DOMA, whether same-
sex marriages validly performed in one state would have been recognized in a
second state, nor explores whether traditional conflict of laws doctrine would per-
mit nonrecognition of such marriages based on the public policy of the second
state. For sources exploring these subjects, see infra note 22.
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conceived of Congress' power as subject to a one-way ratchet. The sec-
ond section considers how DOMA's effects conflict with Madison's view
of the Clause. The third section assesses the procedures theory in
light of modern commentary on the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The
fourth section notes that all prior congressional action pursuant to its
full faith and credit power has conformed to the one-way ratchet and
procedures theories.
Part V compares the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
other constitutional provisions authorizing Congress to act. On bal-
ance, comparing Congress' power under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause with the grants of congressional authority in the Fourteenth
Amendment, Article III, the Elections Clauses, and the Fugitive Slave
Clause suggests the ratchet theory and the procedures theory are in
fact plausible and persuasive interpretations of Congress' power.
Finally, Part VI addresses whether the constitutional principles
underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause support the ratchet the-
ory. The Article concludes first that the ratchet theory and the proce-
dures theory offer plausible and superior interpretations of the
Clause, and second that Congress overreached its constitutional au-
thority when it passed DOMA.
II. DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
A. The Perceived Threat of a 'Tyrannical Hawaii"
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held in Baehr v. Lewin that
the Hawaii marriage statute,14 which requires marriage to be be-
tween a man and a woman, discriminates on the basis of gender in
possible violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii Consti-
tution.15 On remand,' 6 the trial court determined that the sex dis-
crimination was not justified by a compelling state interest.17 The
case is now pending appeal.' 8
14. HAw. REv. STAT. § 572-1 (1985).
15. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
16. The Hawaii Supreme Court provided the trial court with the following instruc-
tion: "On remand, in accordance with the 'strict scrutiny' standard, the burden
will rest on [the defendant] to overcome the presumption that HRS § 572-1 is
unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests and
is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights."
Id. at 68.
17. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). See
also Carey Goldberg, Hawaii Judge Ends Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1996, at Al.
18. The Baehr trial court judge stayed the decision pending appeal at the state's re-
quest. For a history of Hawaii's response to Baehr, including legislative propos-
als to prevent same-sex marriages, see David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex
Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 1, 14-
16 (1997).
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The remand of Baehr caused many people to anticipate Hawaiian
recognition of same-sex marriage' 9 and thus stimulated a national
conversation concerning the propriety of same-sex marriages. Amidst
major debate over whether same-sex marriage is desirable in the first
place, gay rights advocates celebrated. 20 Both opponents and advo-
cates of same-sex marriage posited that gay and lesbian couples could
marry in Hawaii and enjoy the incidents of marriage in their home
states.2 1 The debate spawned a plethora of articles examining the in-
evitable conflict of law question: would same-sex marriages cele-
brated in Hawaii be recognized outside Hawaii?22 Opponents of same-
sex marriage cited Baehr and the efforts of same-sex marriage advo-
19. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 2905,
2906; Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incen-
tives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 747 n.2 (1995).
20. There is substantial debate within the gay and lesbian community as to whether
or not the ability to enter into marriage-arguably an oppressive institution-is
even desirable. Compare Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the
Right to Marry, NAVL GAY & LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, reprinted in LESBIAN & GAY
MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMIMENTS, PUBLC CEREMONIES 17 (Suzanne Sherman
ed., 1992)(arguing that equality in marriage for gays and lesbians will provide
the foundation for the end of discrimination), and Evan Wolfson, Crossing the
Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-com-
munity Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567, 604-08 (1995)(stating
that domestic partnership ordinances lack the economic benefits and emotional
symbolism of state recognition of same-sex marriage), with Nancy D. Politkoff,
We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will
Not 'Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage", 79 VA. L. REv.
1535, 1536 (1993)(describing the struggle for recognition of same-sex marriage as
"an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an
inherently problematic institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian and
gay liberation"). See generally Wuiuz N. ESERmGFG JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CrIZD Coisurm~ENT 51-85 (1996); Bar-
bara J. Cox, Same Sex Marriages and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are
We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIs. L. REv. 1033, 1035 & nn.10-
12 (citing sources discussing the debate within the gay and lesbian community).
21. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Sen. Hatch); HousE
REPORT, supra note 6, at 7, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. 2905, 2911; Joan Bis-
kupic, Once Unthinkable, Now Under Debate: Same Sex Marriage Issue to Take
Center Stage in Senate, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1996, at Al. For a survey of the
benefits and burdens that legally married couples currently enjoy, and thus
same-sex married couples might someday enjoy, see David L. Chambers, What If?
The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay
Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996).
22. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 20; Deborah Henson, Will Same Sex Marriages Be Rec-
ognized in Sister States: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on
State Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Mar-
riages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LouisvnJE J. FAM. L. 551, 553-
556 (1994); Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of
Law Implications of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 IniD. L. REV.
450, 454-66 (1994); Thomas Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and
Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 499, 516-28 (1995); Note, In Sickness and In Health, In Hawaii and Where
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cates as a call to action; the specter of a "Tyrannical Hawaii," ready
judicially to impose its sanction of same-sex marriages on unwilling
states, became a popular target of political animosity. 23
As commentators have noted, however, the threat that states op-
posed to same-sex marriage would be forced to recognize same-sex
marriages under the Full Faith and Credit Clause was unfounded.
The interstate recognition of marriages is governed by conflict of law
rules, not the Full Faith and Credit Clause.24 Although well-estab-
lished conflict of law doctrine declares that marriages are recognized
as valid if they were valid in the state where celebrated,2 5 the "public
policy exception" to the "place of celebration" rule allows a state to
deny recognition to marriages that violate the state's public policy. 26
Hence, the threat posed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to states
opposed to same-sex marriage was overstated.2 7
Else?: Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Same Sex Marriages, 109 HARv. L.
REV. 2038 (1996).
23. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 23 (statement of Gary L. Bauer, Presi-
dent Family Research Council); id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Hatch); HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 6, at 6, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C-N. 2905, 2910.
24. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA- Why the Defense of Marriage
Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IowA L. REy. (forthcoming 1998)(manuscript at 9, on
file with the Author).
25. See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 210, 9A U.LA. 176 (1987)("AI1 mar-
riages contracted... outside this State, that were valid at the time of the contract
or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted
... are valid in this State."). See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 8, reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2912; EUGENE F. ScoLEs & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF
LAws § 13.5 (2d ed. 1992); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLCT OF LAWS § 283
(1971).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 283(2) (1971)(stating that a
valid marriage will be recognized everywhere "unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses
and the marriage at the time of the marriage." (emphasis added)). As Professor
Larry Kramer has written,
"Public policy" functions as an escape from the usual conflicts rules:
Content with its choice-of-law rules in most cases, a court may on occa-
sion find itself asked to apply a law significantly at odds with forum no-
tions ofjustice or good policy. In such cases, the court can use the public
policy doctrine to make an exception, refusing to apply the undesirable
law.
Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1972 (1997). See also Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-22 (1979)("[The] Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
require a State to apply another State's law in violation of its legitimate public
policy."); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412 (1955). The constitutionality of the
public policy exception has been questioned. See Kramer, supra (arguing that the
public policy exception conflicts with the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
27. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 26, at 1966 ('The brouhaha over Hawaii's antici-
pated legalization of same-sex marriages is a big dud from a conflict of laws per-
spective. There is simply no problem; other states do not have to recognize such
marriages."). Federal legislators were well aware of the public policy exception
[Vol. 76:604
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To national legislators, however, several things were clear. First,
Hawaii might confer marriage licenses on same-sex couples. If so, gay
couples might leave their domiciles where they could not marry,
marry in Hawaii, and then return to their domiciles seeking recogni-
tion of their marriages under the "place of celebration" rule.28 Due to
the interstitial nature of the relationship between state and federal
law,2 9 recognition of same-sex marriage would have effects at both the
state and federal levels.
Second, a flurry of state activity alerted national legislators to the
popularity of opposing same-sex marriage. 30 Anticipating the inevita-
ble conflict of laws issue, many states enacted legislation codifying
their opposition to same-sex marriage as a matter of state "public pol-
icy."3 1 State courts could have denied recognition to same-sex mar-
riages as a matter of public policy absent legislative authorization.32
Such legislation was therefore not required to prevent the recognition
of same-sex marriage. These state legislatures nonetheless feared
their state courts would not necessarily find same-sex marriage repug-
nant as a matter of public policy.33 In fact, several law review articles
advocated that the public policy exception should be construed nar-
rowly and should not be used to deny recognition to same-sex mar-
riages performed in Hawaii.3 4 One of the ironies of the DOMA saga is
how this body of literature sympathetic to same-sex marriage was
used to justify the Act: DOMA's supporters insisted that federal inter-
vention was necessary since these authors had concluded that the
public policy exception should not be available.35 Thus, the research
that could release states from the requirement of recognizing foreign marriages.
See Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 44 (statement of Prof. Sunstein).
28. This strategy was recognized by both advocates and opponents of same-sex mar-
riage. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 9-10 (statement of Sen. Nick-
les)("The timing of [DOMA] was really brought about by the [Baehr] decision and
by several activists that want to have same sex marriages throughout the coun-
try."); id. at 44 (statement of Prof. Sunstein)(The impetus for this bill is the fear
that people will rush to Hawaii, get married and then bind the 49 states.').
29. Federal law traditionally relies on state law definitions of family relationships.
See generally RicHxAR H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WEcHSLR's TH FEDERAL
COURTS AND E FEDERAL SYsTEm (4th ed. 1996). See also infra note 55.
30. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-10, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2913-14.
31. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 24 (manuscript at 4); Henry J. Reske, A Matter
of Full Faith: Legislators Scramble to Bar Recognition of Gay Marriages, A.B.A.
J., July 1996, at 32 (stating that "legislators in more than 30 states and in Con-
gress have introduced legislation to ensure the states will not have to recognize"
same-sex marriages).
32. See Kramer, supra note 26, at 1975.
33. See id. at 1976.
34. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 20, at 1099-118; Henson, supra note 22, at 553-56;
Hovermill, supra note 22, at 454-66.
35. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 9, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2913 ("But even as the Committee believes that States currently possess the abil-
1997]
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of these authors, who tried to limit the public policy exception and
promote the universal recognition of same-sex marriages, has ulti-
mately been co-opted to promote DOMA.
Third, opponents of same-sex marriage characterized the probable
recognition of same-sex marriage as an attack on states' rights: the
rights of those states that prohibit the performance of same-sex mar-
riages would be infringed when gay couples who wed in Hawaii en-
tered their states. Notably, the states' rights debate most often was
characterized as how Hawaii threatened the rights of states that pro-
hibited same-sex marriages, rather than how states that refused to
recognize same-sex marriages threatened Hawaii's interests in having
marriages that were performed in Hawaii recognized elsewhere. The
states' rights argument, however, can cut both ways because DOMA
undermines the rights of those states that recognize same-sex mar-
riage. Justice Frankfurter articulated this dual nature of any conflict
of laws question when he wrote that "[i]t is ... no more rhetorical to
say that Nevada is seeking to impose its policy upon North Carolina
than it is to say that North Carolina is seeking to impose its policy on
Nevada."36 The dual nature of the same-sex marriage conflict of laws
question gives rise to what will be called the "states' rights
conundrum."37
Despite the two sides to the states' rights conundrum, only one side
was emphasized during the debate over DOMA: Hawaiian recognition
of same-sex marriage was seen as an assault on the policies of those
states opposed to same-sex marriage. The other half of the conun-
drum-that Hawaii had an interest in other states' recognition of Ha-
waiian marriages-was comparatively ignored. The protection of
"states' rights" is a political issue of enduring popularity, and it was a
major factor for those who supported DOMA.38
ity to avoid recognizing a same-sex 'marriage' license from another State, it recog-
nizes that that conclusion is far from certain. For example, there is a burgeoning
body of legal scholarship-some of it inspired directly by the Hawaiian lawsuit-
to the effect that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does mandate extraterritorial
recognition of 'marriage' licenses given to homosexual couples.").
36. 317 U.S. 287, 307 (1942)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
37. Professor McConnell aptly describes the states' rights conundrum in his letter to
Senator Hatch in support of DOMA: "When two states have inconsistent laws on
the same subject, it would literally be impossible for the each to be given effect
throughout the country." Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 58 (letter of Prof.
McConnell to Sen. Hatch). McConnell argues that decreasing faith and credit for
Hawaiian same-sex marriages necessarily protects the rights of states that decry
same-sex marriage. "[Niot all state laws can be enforced everywhere, if the laws
are in conflict. If Hawaii's law recognizing same-sex marriage is enforced in
other states, the laws of those states will be stripped of their efficacy." Id. See
also infra text accompanying notes 199-207.
38. See Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of Sen. Nickles). See also
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REv. 499 (1995); Rory
K Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HAsTINGs L.J. 1029, 1065-66
612 [Vol. 76:604
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Fourth, the United States Supreme Court had recently decided
Romer v. Evans.3 9 At issue in Romer was an amendment to the Colo-
rado Constitution, which provided that neither the state nor any mu-
nicipality could prohibit discrimination on the basis of "homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships."40
The Supreme Court invalidated the amendment,41 provoking a mixed
political response. Gay rights advocates lauded the result.4 2 Critics of
Romer characterized it as part of a movement to grant "special
rights"43 to gays and lesbians and decried the decision as an abuse by
activist judges.44 In fact, the language of Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion is the same language used by those who warn of a "Tyrannical
Hawaii." By stating that "[tihis Court has no business imposing on all
Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from which the
Members of this institution are selected,"45 Scalia characterized
(1995)(discussing states' rights positions in the debate over federalization of
crime); Pace Jefferson McConkie, Civil Rights and Federalism: Is There a More
Perfect Union for the Heirs to the Promise of Brown?, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 389,
391; Symposium, The Future of the Federal Courts, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 263, 288-89
(1996).
39. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
40. Id. at 1623.
41. Id. at 1628-29.
42. See, e.g., Catherine Brennan, Anti-Gay Law Unconstitutional, DAILY RECORD,
May 21, 1996; Ina Jaffe, Supreme Court Decision Won't End Debate on Gay
Rights (National Public Radio, Morning Edition, May 24, 1996)(LEXIS, News Li-
brary, NPR File, Transcript No. 1875-4)(quoting Lambda Legal Defense and Edu-
cation Fund Staff attorney that Romer v. Evans "dramatically improves the legal
landscape for future gay rights cases").
43. Opponents of the gay rights movement argue that they are opposed to "special
rights" for gays and lesbians. See, e.g., William Schneider, Too Hot to Handle?
Go to the Courts, NATL J., June 1, 1996, at 1234; Frank Rich, The War in the
Wings, N.Y. Tams, Oct. 9, 1996, at A21. For a critique of the "special rights"
argument, see Samuel A. Marcosson, The 'Special Rights" Canard in the Debate
Over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DArxE J.L. ETmIcs & PuB. PoL'y 137
(1995); Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv. L.
REv. 1905, 1906-07 (1993).
44. In a National Public Radio report concerning the public response to Romer v.
Evans, Ina Jaffe reported that Robert Knight, the Director of Cultural Studies of
the Family Research Council, predicts that "the next great crusade for conserva-
tives will be curbing the judiciary." Jaffe, supra note 42. Mr. Knight stated that
[iut kind of makes you wonder, you know, what it takes for people of
traditional values to get a Supreme Court justice to agree with them....
Because the judges are clearly out of control and are contemptuous of the
moral heritage of America. So I believe people will call for things like
maybe a two-term limit for federal judges, up to and including Supreme
Court justices. People will demand that we return to being a democracy
and not run by a few people in black robes.
Id.
45. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Romer as the inappropriate judicial imposition of the views of an elite
group on others.4 6
DOMA was in part a reaction to the controversial decision in
Romer. One commentator identified DOMA as a necessary response
to Romer:
In [Romer v. Evans], the U.S. Supreme Court showed how little regard some
powerful jurists have for the right of people to govern themselves in a demo-
cratic republic. Congress needs to act now to reassert the legislative branch's
constitutional role as the voice of the people and the maker of the laws. It
needs to send a message to the Supreme Court and other courts .... We
cannot afford to let judges usurp any more power and tyrannize an already
besieged moral code. The Defense of Marriage Act is a powerful antidote to
the destructive trend that has gripped this country at the hands of some inju-
dicious judges.4 7
Fifth, it was an election year. The debate over same-sex marriage
featured the unusual "switching of sides" by politicians who typically
espoused contrary opinions. Although DOMA flouts some of the favor-
ite causes of modern conservatism,48 conservatives supported DOMA
in droves. Conservative politicians, who usually advocate minimal
federal interference with states' issues, suddenly demanded federal
intervention in the institution of marriage.49 Regulating marriage al-
ways has been the prerogative of the states and beyond the realm of
federal regulation; DOMA enters this traditional domain of the states
to create a federal definition of marriage.50 As one commentator has
pointed out,
"[if] all of this moral talk is at odds with federalism [because regulating mar-
riage is traditionally the states' role]," then the decision of the Republican
leadership to sacrifice the federalism principle in favor of a moral one must
46. Cf HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 6, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA-N. 2905, 2910
(describing judges in Hawaii as "prepared to foist the newly-coined institution of
homosexual 'marriage' upon an unwilling Hawaiian public").
47. Hearings 7/11196, supra note 7, at 23 (statement of Gary L. Bauer, President of
the Family Research Council).
48. See 142 Cong. Rec. S10100, S10118 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996)(hearings on
DOMA)[hereinafter Hearings 9/10/96](statement of Sen. Feinstein)("For a Con-
gress whose mantra has been returning power to the states, this legislation, it
would seem, is a serious retreat from that idea, giving broad new power to the
Federal government in an area historically left under State control."); id. (state-
ment of Sen. Wyden)('This bill... seems to me a repudiation of traditional con-
servatism.... [I]t is Big Brother to the core."). See also Eskridge, supra note 4,
at 11.
49. Interestingly, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was opposed on the basis
that the federal government and the federal judiciary should not usurp state do-
mestic relations law. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism and the
Federal Courts, 79 IowA L. REv. 1073, 1108-11 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule
of Love"." Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2196-206
(1996). Comparing the debates over VAWA and DOMA raises interesting ques-
tions about which values in marriage the federal government is hoping to protect.
50. See Paula Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Gay and Lesbian Family
Recognition, 5 J.L. & PoL'Y 107, 109 n.2 (1996). See also infra note 55.
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illuminate their hierarchy of values, at least in an election year. However the
Constitution is finally interpreted on the question of same-sex marriage, poli-
ticians (including the president) know that at the moment there is little public
support for it and little likelihood of serious political damage in opposing it.5 1
Liberals, too, switched sides. Although often accused of reading
federal powers too broadly, liberals argued that the federal govern-
ment had no business defining marriage and that DOMA violated Ha-
waii's rights.5 2  The retreat from traditionally-held positions
illustrates that the debate over same-sex marriage was unusually
politicized. Furthermore, the speed with which DOMA was intro-
duced and passed indicates that the political reward was foremost in
the sponsors' minds. As one commentator noted, "[t]he bill is on a fast
track, probably too fast for any but an election year."5 3 National legis-
lators saw in the combination of these factors a political move with
guaranteed popularity. Citing its constitutional authority under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress passed DOMA.54
B. Defense of Marriage Act
DOMA has two provisions-the "federal definitions" provision, and
the "choice of law" provision. The federal definitions provision defines
marriage as "a legal union between one man and one woman" for fed-
eral purposes.5 5 The choice of law provision defuses the constitutional
requirement of full faith and credit and instead authorizes states to
51. Paul Reidinger, Politically Expedient, A-BA. J., Oct. 1996, at 78,80 (quoting Ann
Althouse, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin at Madison).
52. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 3 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
53. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 11.
54. DOMA passed the House by a vote of 342-67 on July 12, 1996. 142 CONG. Ec.
H7505-06 (July 12, 1996). It passed the Senate by a vote of 85-14 on September
10, 1996. 142 CONG. REc. S10129 (Sept. 10, 1996). President Clinton signed the
bill on September 21, 1996. Peter Baker, President Quietly Signs Law Aimed at
Gay Marriages, WAsH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at A21.
55. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, § 3(a), 1 U.S.C-A. § 7 (West 1997)("In determin-
ing the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpre-
tation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman
as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife.").
The federal definitions provision of DOMA raises its own set of interesting
constitutional questions. It arguably assaults principles of federalism. The Fed-
eralist Papers delineated areas of federal and state interest, noting that issues of
family relations were properly within the province of the states. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALisT No. 17, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)(stat-
ing that state governments should have priority in "regulating all those personal
interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more
immediately awake"). Traditionally, federal courts look to state law to supply the
definitions of domestic relations; this is part of the interstitial nature of federal
and state law. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956)(applying the
state definition of "children" in an action arising under federal copyright laws);
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deny full faith and credit to any act, record, or judicial proceeding that
recognizes the existence of a same-sex marriage.5 6 This provision pro-
vides that
No State, territory or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record or judicial proceeding of any
other States, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from
such relationship.
5 7
At first blush, DOMA resembles the prophylactic measures taken
by states to deny recognition of same-sex marriages on public policy
grounds.5 8 Indeed, both supporters and opponents of the Act stressed
its redundancy in light of the public policy exception to the recognition
of marriage.5 9 The House Report accompanying DOMA argued that
DOMA is constitutional because same-sex marriages do not have to be
recognized by states in any case: "[Tihe result is the same in both
cases, and so there cannot be a constitutionally significant difference
between these mechanisms."60 As Professor Cass Sunstein testified to
the Senate Judiciary Committee, DOMA was "probably either point-
less or unconstitutional." 61
Closer analysis reveals, however, that DOMA does not merely de-
clare or describe state power to disregard same-sex marriages under
the public policy exception. Rather, it authorizes a greater disregard
of same-sex marriages than would be possible for states under the
public policy exception. 62 Absent DOMA, state measures declaring
FALLON 'r AL., supra note 29. Section 3 breaks from the tradition of federal
courts importing the state-defined constellation of family relationships.
For a list of the disabilities imposed on same-sex couples pursuant to Section
3, see generally Koppelman, supra note 24 (manuscript at 5-7). Professor Koppel-
man opines that the definitional provision, taken alone, may be constitutional as
"Congress obviously has the power to define the terms of the U.S. Code." Id.
(manuscript at 7). He ultimately concludes, however, that the "invidious intent
that is inferable under [Romer v. Evans] infects both provisions of the law," and
therefore the entire statute is unconstitutional. Id. (manuscript at 7-15).
56. See HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 27, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C-.N. 2905,
2931.
57. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
58. See, e.g., Joel R. Brandes & Carole L. Weidman, Same-Sex Marriage, 217 N.Y.
L.J. 3 (1997); Todd D. Robichaud, Defense of Marriage-Or Attack on Family?,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1996, at A24. See also supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
59. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 61 (statement of Prof. Sunstein);
Tribe, Less Perfect Union, supra note 8.
60. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 27, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. 2905, 2931.
61. Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 44 (statement of Prof. Sunstein). It is worth
noting that if the ratchet theory is valid, DOMA could be simultaneously point-
less (because states could already do what DOMA permits) and unconstitutional
(because it overreaches the constitutional limits on Congress' authority).
62. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public
Policy, 76 Txx. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998)(manuscript at 81-84, on file with au-
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same-sex marriages violative of public policy would not have com-
pletely foreclosed all interstate recognition of same-sex marriages.
Rather, pre-DOMA jurisprudence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
would have required recognition of same-sex marriages in some
circumstances.
Although the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not dis-
tinguish between the degrees of credit afforded to acts, records, and
judicial proceedings, the three categories are accorded different levels
of faith and credit. 63 Acts and records are accorded a weak level of
recognition, 64 whereas judgments receive the strongest faith and
credit protection and cannot be disregarded on public policy
grounds.6 5 Absent DOMA, states might have invoked the tiered sys-
tem of full faith and credit jurisprudence to adjust their recognition of
same-sex marriages to the extent same-sex marriages clashed with
state public policy. 6 6 State courts could have refused to recognize
thor)(describing how DOMA impliedly alters preexisting law by allowing states to
disregard "all judgments in which the prevailing party pleaded the existence of a
same-sex marriage").
63. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., No. 96-653, 1998 WL 7072, at *7 (U.S. Jan.
13, 1998). Compare Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial
States: The Constitutional Foundations for Choice of Law, 92 CoLUm. L. REv.
249, 295 (1992)(arguing that the Clause and the implementing act require full
faith and credit for statutes of sister states), with Kurt H. Nadleman, Full Faith
and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal,
56 MICH. L. REv. 33, 73 (1957).
64. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., No. 96-653, 1998 WL 7072, at *7 (U.S.
Jan. 13, 1998); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)(stating that the
forum may apply its own rules of law if some reasonable relationship exists be-
tween the forum and the transaction or parties, such that the forum has a legiti-
mate interest in doing so).
65. In Fauntleroy v. Lum, the Supreme Court held that a mistaken application of
Mississippi law by a Missouri court was a valid judgment in Mississippi, stating
that "as the jurisdiction of the Missouri court is not open to dispute, the judgment
cannot be impeached even if it went upon a misapprehension of Mississippi law."
210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908). See also Baker v. General Motors Corp., No. 96-653,
1998 WL 7072, at *7 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1998); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356,382 n.26
(1990); RESTATErmNT (SEcoND) CoNFLc'T OF LAws § 117 (1971); LEONARD WIL-
LTAMs LVY ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERIcAN CONSTITUTION 823-24 (1986);
Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Con-
gress, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 89, 89; Paul A. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the
Conflict of Laws, 59 HAmv. L. REv. 1210, 1225 (1946).
66. As Professor Kramer has explained, marriage cases feature two refinements in
how the public policy exception has been used. First, a state may recognize that
"some differences are more matters of degree than of fundamental policy," such
that "a state that permits sixteen-year-olds to marry may apply another state's
law permitting fifteen-year-olds to do so, but not one extending the right to nine-
year-olds." Second, "many courts distinguish between the validity of a marriage
and the ability to enjoy its 'incidents." Kramer, supra note 26, at 1970-71. Thus,
based on state public policy, courts might distinguish between the different inci-
dents of marriage for purposes of same-sex marriage recognition. See, e.g., In re
Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)(distinguishing be-
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same-sex marriages for some purposes (e.g., spousal benefits, joint tax
returns, and residential zoning laws),6 7 but might have enforced judg-
ments that incorporated a reference to a same-sex marriage (e.g., a
judgment in a wrongful death suit brought by the surviving spouse of
a same-sex marriage).68 In this way, the pre-DOMA Full Faith and
Credit Clause probably would have compelled at least some recogni-
tion, although indirect, of same-sex marriages.
DOMA, however, dismantles the tiered system by withdrawing
faith and credit from acts, records, and proceedings that recognize
same-sex marriages for all purposes.6 9 Congress presumed the Full
tween recognizing bigamous marriages when a decedent was still alive and divid-
ing the property after his death).
Absent DOMA, courts of a state that did not perform same-sex marriages
might have distinguished between requiring that state to extend spousal benefits
to a same-sex couple and enforcing a wrongful death judgment that recognized a
same-sex marriage.
There is a difference ... between circumstances under which a state will
create a marriage relation for its domiciliaries, or recognize the existence
of that status when raised with reference to those domiciled else-
where.... The courts do recognize the legal existence of and give effect
to foreign matrimonial unions that do not conform to requirements for
the marriage relationship among their own people.
EUGENE F. ScoLEs & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 446 (1982)(citations
omitted).
67. See Koppelman, supra note 24 (manuscript at 2). As a practical matter, inter-
state recognition of marriages is a good idea. When invalidating a North Caro-
lina marriage evasion law that refused to give full faith and credit to an ex parte
Nevada divorce, the Supreme Court held that a divorce decree had to be recog-
nized before protecting the legitimacy of the marriage that followed such di-
vorces. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 295-96, 302-03 (1942). The
Supreme Court advanced the following rationales for recognizing the divorce de-
cree: the need to protect the legitimacy of children; the need to protect the newly
married couple from criminal prosecution for bigamy; the federalist mandate of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause; and Nevada's state interest in its domiciliaries.
See id. The interests cited in Williams justify recognition of both out-of-state di-
vorces and out-of-state marriages.
For a discussion of the historical development of full faith and credit doctrine
with regard to divorce, see generally Neil R. Feigenson, Extraterritorial Recogni-
tion of Divorce Decrees in the Nineteenth Century, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119
(1990); Michael M. O'Hear, Note, "Some of the Most Embarrassing Questions"
Extraterritorial Divorces and the Problem of Jurisdiction Before Pennoyer, 104
YALE L.J. 1507 (1995).
68. See Koppelman, supra note 24 (manuscript at 26). See also infra text accompany-
ing notes 116-17.
69. Although Professor McConnell wrote a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee
supporting the constitutionality of DOMA, he suggested it was an overbroad solu-
tion to the problem raised by the threat of a 'Tyrannical Hawaii."
I question whether Congress really intends some of the results that
could obtain under the proposed Act. For example, if a same-sex couple
resident in Hawaii were involved in an automobile accident in Michigan,
does it make any sense to treat them as "unmarried" for purposes of tort
and insurance law? One way to handle this problem would be to declare
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Faith and Credit Clause could play a role in marriage recognition. It
therefore sought to preempt the Clause from talking effect in the first
place.O The House Report accompanying DOIA described the Act as
a "narrow, targeted relaxation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause"7 1
and purported to take "the Full Faith and Credit Clause out of the
legal equation surrounding the Hawaiian situation."72
To "relax" the full faith and credit mandate, DOMA allows states to
deny effect to judgments by authorizing states to deny "effect" to any
"judicial proceeding ... respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage ... or a right or claim
arising from such a relationship."73 By withdrawing the protection of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause from judgments, DOMA departs
from existing law and therefore is not merely declaratory.74
As the public policy exception is well-established in conflicts of law
jurisprudence, the states were operating in familiar territory. Con-
that the legal right of two persons to be married to one another is deter-
mined by the state of common domicile from time to time.... This would
leave in place ordinary choice of law rules for cases in which domiciliar-
ies of one state were temporarily present in another state. That would
be in keeping with longstanding principles regarding the legal status of
"sojourners-principles that have been honored in the past even in the
face of such divisive subjects as slavery.
Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 58-59 (letter ofProf. McConnell to Sen. Hatch).
70. Proponents justified DOMA as necessary to avoid the result otherwise required
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S12015 (daily ed.
Sept. 30, 1996)(statement of Sen. Abraham); Biskupic, supra note 21, at Al
("[Proponents] say the legislation is necessary to make absolutely clear that
states need not recognize a marriage from Hawaii and to preempt any move by a
liberal judge to rule otherwise, particularly since the Constitution's "full faith and
credit' clause usually requires states to recognize official acts of other states." (em-
phasis added)).
71. See HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 28, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. 2905,
2932.
72. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 2905, 2921. It should be recognized that
states probably would not have been obligated to recognize a marriage under the
direct language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a state "act, record, or
judicial proceeding." "[Elach state as a matter of its own law recognizes that the
only states whose law might potentially be applicable to determine the validity of
the marriage are the states of celebration and the domicile at the time of the
marriage." Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense
of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U. PrrT. L. REv. 279, 291 (1997). Because
marriages do not comfortably fit within the language of the Clause does not mean
that DOMA did not change existing law. Even if a marriage, taken alone, could
not be characterized as a state "act, record, or proceeding," states may have been
obligated to recognize same-sex marriages for at least some purposes, e.g., giving
full faith and credit to judgments that recognized the existence of same-sex
marriages.
73. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 110 Stat. 2419.
74. See Koppelman, supra note 62 (manuscript at 81-84); Koppelman, supra note 24
(manuscript at 24-27).
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gress' action, by contrast, was entirely unprecedented. 7 5 By employ-
ing a novel strategy of creating an exception to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to thwart the recognition of same-sex marriage, Con-
gress embarked on a mission of questionable constitutional validity.
C. Debate over the Defense of Marriage Act
Congress' unorthodox manipulation of full faith and credit did not
go unnoticed. The novel restriction of full faith and credit, coupled
with the dearth of legislative precedent, spurred substantial debate
concerning the scope of Congress' full faith and credit authority.
DOMA's critics argued that Congress could legislate only to in-
crease or augment the full faith and credit available to state acts,
records, and proceedings. 76 In other words, Congress' power under
the Effects Clause is subject to a "one-way ratchet." Under this read-
ing, the affirmative grant of congressional authority does not include a
negative power to create exceptions to the constitutional mandate of
full faith and credit.
Supporters of DOMA rejected the one-way ratchet theory as a limit
on Congress' full faith and credit authority77 and disputed the charac-
terization of Congress' action as nullifying the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.78 Invoking the threat of a '7yrannical Hawaii" eager to im-
pose same-sex marriages on unwilling states,7 9 DOMA's supporters
posited that Congress had to make exceptions to the constitutional
mandate to protect the rights of states that reject same-sex mar-
riage.SO Supporters justified the unprecedented nature of this use of
Congress' full faith and credit authority by arguing that the demand
for same-sex marriages was itself unprecedented and thus compelled
immediate-if novel-action.S1
Because Congress exercises its full faith and credit authority so
infrequently, it is especially difficult to assess whether Congress over-
75. See supra note 7. See also Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 42 (statement of
Prof. Sunstein).
76. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 46 (statement of Prof. Sunstein); Es-
kridge, supra note 4, at 11.
77. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11196, supra note 7, at 25-41 (statement of Prof. Wardle).
See also id. at 58 (letter ofProf. McConnell to Sen. Hatch).
78. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 60 (statement of Prof. Wardle).
79. See, e.g., Patricia Wen, Measure Barring Gay Marriages Seen as Vulnerable, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1996, at B (quoting Jay Sekulow, Chief Counsel for the
American Center for Law and Justice).
80. See HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 26, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 2905,
2930 ("While full faith and credit is the rule-that is, while states are generally
obligated to treat laws of other states as they would their own-Congress retains
a discretionary power to carve out such exceptions as it deems appropriate.").
81. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 52 (comments of David Zwiebel, Gen-
eral Counsel and Director, Government Affairs, Agudath Israel of America).
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stepped any constitutional boundaries by passing DOMA.82 Due to
the dearth of legislative precedent, the arguments for and against
DOMA were made in a relative vacuum. One commentator has noted
that "the limits of congressional power under the Effects Clause have
never been examined, in part because Congress has never tested
them."8 3 The balance of this Article will investigate the validity of the
one-way ratchet theory of Congress' full faith and credit power.'
III. TEXTUAL DEFENSE OF THE RATCHET AND
PROCEDURES THEORIES OF FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT
The language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause suggests that
Congress' power is subject to a one-way ratchet. The Clause is con-
structed awkwardly insofar as it authorizes Congress to enforce a con-
stitutional provision that already is self-executing. The first sentence,
demanding that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given," is an affirma-
tive and self-executing mandate.84 The second sentence (the "Effects
Clause"), stating that "Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner," grants Congress discretionary authority to legislate under
this Clause. Although its self-executing nature ostensibly renders en-
forcement unnecessary, the Effects Clause bolsters its self-executing
mandate by authorizing Congress to implement its effects.8 5
Although the combination of the self-executing mandate of full
faith and credit with a grant of discretionary authority seems odd, it is
not a mere accident of drafting. In an early draft of the Clause, the
first sentence used the permissive term "ought," so that full faith and
credit was not a constitutional requirement, and the Effects Clause
used the mandatory term "shall," so that no full faith and credit was
82. See infra section IV.D.
83. Kramer, supra note 26, at 1968; Reidinger, supra note 51, at 80.
84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMIENTAIES ON THE CONSTI-
TEON OF Tim UNrTED STATES § 1309 (5th ed. 1891)("The language is positive,
and declaratory, leaving nothing to future legislation."). Justice Jackson ob-
served that the self-executing nature of the Clause had been "questioned in state
courts," but concluded the Clause is self-executing. "In fact, no requirement of
faith and credit exists unless the clause is self-executing." Jackson, supra note 2,
at 11 n.43 (citations omitted).
85. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. In other words, 'the constitutional clause is self-execut-
ing and legislation is optional." Laycock, supra note 63, at 293. Other constitu-
tional provisions combine a self-executing mandate with a grant of discretionary
power to Congress. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress a
power clearly limited by a one-way ratchet. The self-executing Section 1 reads as
follows: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the
United States ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. Section 2 grants Congress the
"power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id. § 2. Congress' en-
forcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment has never been understood to
allow Congress to make exceptions to the prohibition against slavery.
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required until Congress acted.8 6 Madison suggested the provision be
altered:
Madison then moved to substitute "shall" for "ought to" and "may" for the first
"shall[.]"... The effect of Madison's amendment was to make the clause self-
executing, commanding full faith and credit in the constitutional text and
making congressional action discretionary, instead of commanding congres-
sional action and leaving the clause dependent on the implementation of the
command to Congress.8
7
Combining a self-executing mandate with discretionary congres-
sional power was therefore deliberate. The precise contours of the
congressional authority, however, remain unclear. Does the Effects
Clause authorize Congress to prescribe alternative rules and thus
weaken the mandate of the first sentence? Or, does the Effects Clause
limit Congress to enforcing the terms of the self-executing mandate of
the first sentence?
A. Interpreting '"Tll Faith and Credit shall be given"
One of the strongest defenses of the ratchet theory is textual: the
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not expressly authorize Congress to
decrease full faith and credit. Instead, the first sentence of the provi-
sion requires "Full Faith." The use of the word "full" connotes an af-
firmative understanding-all the faith and credit that can be given
must be given.8 8 The United States Supreme Court has emphasized
the positive nature of the provision, stating that the Clause (and its
implementing statute) requires "not some, but full" faith and credit.8 9
This reading of the first sentence supports the one-way ratchet theory.
B. Interpreting "the Effect thereof"
Interpretation of the Effects Clause is at the heart of the debate
over DOMA. Plainly stated, the second sentence of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause grants power to Congress. How does this grant of con-
gressional authority operate in conjunction with the affirmative man-
date of the first sentence of the Clause? There are two ways to answer
this question. First, the second sentence can be understood to modify
and create an exception to the first sentence. Alternatively, the power
created by the Effects Clause can be understood as bound by a one-
way ratchet such that Congress may act only to implement the man-
86. The early draft stated that "[flull faith and credit ought to be given in each State
to the public acts, records, and Judicial proceedings of every other State, and the
Legislature shall by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts,
Records, & proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." Laycock, supra
note 63, at 291.
87. Id. at 292. See also 2 STORY, supra note 84, § 1303; 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 489 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
88. See Laycock, supra note 63, at 296.
89. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938).
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date of and police compliance with the first sentence. Each interpreta-
tion will be considered in turn.
DOMA's supporters argue that the Effects Clause functions as a
type of "exceptions clause" that authorizes Congress to weaken full
faith and credit. As Professor Michael McConnell has argued,
[tlo "prescribe the effect" of something is to determine what effect it will have.
In the absence of powerful evidence to the contrary, the natural meaning of
these words is that Congress can prescribe that a particular class of acts will
have no effect at all, or that their effect will be confined to their place of
origin.9 0
The House Report accompanying DOMA states that "[wihile full faith
and credit is the rule ... Congress retains a discretionary power to
carve out such exceptions as it deems appropriate."9 1 Under this
view, empowering Congress solely to enforce what is already a self-
executing imperative is pointless; the Effects Clause arguably would
be surplusage unless Congress could alter the mandate of the first
sentence.
DOMA's opponents argue that the second sentence does not under-
cut the mandate of the first. Instead, the Effects Clause is a "policing
clause" that is limited to enforcing compliance with the first sentence
against state infringement.9 2 As Professor David Currie notes, "the
power to flesh out full faith and credit may have been inserted out of
an abundance of caution."9 3 Given the absence of language expressly
authorizing Congress to decrease full faith and credit, the Effects
Clause should not be read to license Congress to interfere with the
mandate of the first sentence.94 One commentator notes "[tihat
90. Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 57 (letter of Prof. McConnell to Sen. Hatch).
91. See House REPORT, supra note 6, at 25, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 2905,
2929.
92. Cf Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 74-75 (1993). Professor Aynes, in describing Congress'
lack of enforcement power in other Article IV provisions, states that
[a] major tenet of antislavery constitutionalism held that. . . all the pro-
visions of Article IV, except the Full Faith and Credit Clause, were part
of a compact with the states. According to this theory, the Constitution
commanded state adherence to these provisions even though Congress
lacked the power to enforce these rights against state infringement.
Id. Under one reading of this theory, Congress' full faith and credit power is
limited to enforcing compliance with the Full Faith and Credit Clause against
state infringement. In this context, states were obliged to obey the Constitution,
but Congress could not enforce this obligation. Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, by contrast, states were obliged to obey the Constitution, and Congress
could enforce this obligation. See also infra section V.D.
93. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Struc-
ture of Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. Cm. L. ScH. Rou rABLE 161, 171 (1995).
94. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803)("Affirmative words are
often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this
case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no opera-
tion at all.").
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mandatory 'shall' lose some (though obviously not all) of its meaning if
Congress can simply legislate the meaning away."9 5
The text of the Effects Clause is ambiguous, as illustrated by the
weight given to it by both DOMA's supporters and opponents. There-
fore, other sources are needed to interpret the nature and scope of the
power conferred by the Effects Clause. These sources, which include
the historical understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
comparison with other grants of constitutional authority, and the role
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the federal system, help to deci-
pher the meaning of the Effects Clause. They will be discussed in
Parts IV, V, and VI.
C. Interpreting "Congress may prescribe the Manner"
Congress is not delegated plenary power to legislate with regard to
all matters involving full faith and credit under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause; instead, Congress has authority only to "prescribe the
Manner" in which state acts, records, and proceedings "shall be
proved."9 6 Under one reading, the "prescribe the Manner" provision
characterizes the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a tool for Congress
to regulate the procedure, but not the substantive law, of full faith and
credit. 9 7 If the Framers wanted Congress to legislate with regard to
the substantive content of the laws, presumably they could have
drafted a provision stating that "Congress may prescribe which acts,
records and proceedings shall be proved."
This interpretation of the "prescribe the Manner" provision gives
rise to what shall be called the "procedures theory." Under the proce-
dures theory, Congress can establish procedural requirements that
must be satisfied before full faith and credit will be accorded to acts,
records, and proceedings, but Congress cannot pick and choose among
the substantive content of those acts, records, and proceedings once
the procedural requirements have been met. In short, Congress can
set the rules, but cannot choose the outcome.
If the procedures theory is correct, then DOMA falls outside the
scope of Congress' power. DOMA's content-based selection of acts,
records, and proceedings to be denied credit is not a regulation of pro-
cedure. Moreover, DOMA departs from prior exercise of congressional
95. Kramer, supra note 26, at 2003.
96. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
97. Cf. Keane, supra note 22, at 502 (noting that "[c]hampions of a weak or 'eviden-
tiary' interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause suggest that the Clause
exists merely to provide a method for proving what the law of one state is when
the question arises in another state's courts")(citing Ralph U. Whitten, The Con-
stitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretive Re-
examination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14
CREIGHTON L. REv. 499 (1981)).
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full faith and credit authority, which for the most part complied with
the procedures theory and enforced the mandate of the Clause by cre-
ating authentication procedures. 98
IV. HISTORICAL/INTERPRETIVE DEFENSE OF THE RATCHET
AND PROCEDURES THEORIES
This Part assesses the ratchet theory by considering the historical
understanding of Congress' power. The first section examines the
drafting of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to determine whether the
drafters conceived of Congress' power as subject to a one-way ratchet.
The second section considers how DOMA's effects conflict with
Madison's view of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The third section
assesses the procedures theory in light of modern commentary on the
Clause. The fourth section appraises Congress' previous action pursu-
ant to its full faith and credit power, noting that all previous exercise
of congressional authority has conformed to the one-way ratchet and
has established the procedural method by which full faith and credit
shall be given.
A. Drafting and Adoption of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause
Little information exists to suggest how the drafters expected the
full faith and credit provision to operate. As one treatise explains,
"t]he subject of full faith and credit evoked little discussion in the
Constitutional Convention, and it seems unlikely that there was any
general understanding among the delegates of what the clause was
designed to accomplish."9 9 The decision to grant such congressional
power was nonetheless the product of some deliberation and debate.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause's predecessor is found in the Ar-
ticles of Confederation.00 This version lacked any provisions for en-
98. See infra section IV.C. Other constitutional provisions that authorize procedural,
but not substantive, regulations include Article I, Section 5 (authorizing the
House to 'judge the qualifications" of its members) and Article I, Section 4,
Clause 1 (authorizing states to regulate the Time, Places, and Manner of
Elections).
99. LEVY ET AL., supra note 65, at 823. There is little understanding of what "full
faith and credit" actually meant to the drafters of either the Articles of Confeder-
ation or the Constitution. Professor Max Radin examined the drafting of the
phrase for the Articles of Confederation to discover the original understanding of
full faith and credit, but found little guidance. Max Radin, The Authenticated
Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L. REv. 1, 5 (1944).
100. NowAK & ROTUNDA, CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAw 319 n.2 (identifying Article IV, Clause
3 of the Articles of Confederation as the "ancestor to the modem full faith and
credit clause".); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1919).
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forcing the promise of full faith and credit. 0 ' Thus, upon the
recommendations of James Madison and Gouverneur Morris, the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 added the Effects Clause, granting
Congress enforcement authority.O2
The revision was meant to elevate the interstate recognition of
acts, records, and proceedings above that required under the doctrine
of comity. James Wilson argued on behalf of expanding congressional
authority: "if the legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the
provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place
among all Independent Nations."l03 According to Wilson, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause required more from the states than that
which existed under the doctrine of comity.1 0 4 Edmund RandolphlO5
objected to the Effects Clause on grounds of federalism. He worried
that "the definition of the powers of the Government was so loose as to
give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers."'os Despite
Randolph's concerns, the proposal was adopted.1O7
The historical record of the drafting and the adoption of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, albeit sparse, supports the ratchet theory of
full faith and credit. Although the Framers contemplated questions of
federalism and separation of powers, nothing in the record suggests
they considered whether or not Congress could decrease full faith and
Professor Atwood has explained why the original provision was included in
the Articles of Confederation:
Prior to the Continental Congress, a few colonies, in response to the flee-
ing judgment debtor, enacted legislation which provided for reciprocal
recognition ofjudgments from the courts of the other colonies. The colo-
nists' experience led to the inclusion of a full faith and credit provision in
the Articles of Confederation.
Barbara Ann Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the
Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 66-67 n.37 (1982)(citations
omitted).
101. LEvY ET AL., supra note 65, at 823; Radin, supra note 99, at 9-10.
102. See Cook, supra note 100, at 424; Jackson, supra note 2, at 3-7.
103. 2 FARAND, supra note 87, at 488.
104. Several commentators have noted how the Framers sought to require interstate
recognition of acts, records, and proceedings at a level greater than comity. See,
e.g., Laycock, supra note 63, at 259-60; Radin, supra note 99, at 3.
105. Edmund Randolph served as Governor and Attorney General of Virginia. He was
the leader of the Virginia delegation to the Constitutional Convention, where he
served on the Committee of Detail. M. CONWAY, OMIT rD CHAPTERS OF HISTORY
DISCLOSED IN THE LIFE AND PAPERS OF EDMUND RANDOLPH (1888).
106. 2 FARuRAD, supra note 87, at 488-89. See also Cook, supra note 100, at 425;
Radin, supra note 99, at 7-9 (describing the debate over the amendments to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause).
107. See 2 FARAND, supra note 87, at 489; Cook, supra note 100, at 425. See also
CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF TrE CONSTITUTION 563-66 (1928); Robert N.
Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLMETTE L. REv. 841, 897-
900 (1990)(describing the colloquy over full faith and credit provision at the Phil-
adelphia Constitutional Convention).
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credit.ls0 A reading of the Framers' intent to the opposite effect would
conflict with the dual contentions that first, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause would elevate the recognition above that required by the doc-
trine of comity, and second, the Clause would usurp state power. In
other words, the threat to federalism would not have been anticipated
if Congress had the power to punt the full faith and credit issue to the
states for state-by-state determination. (This is, in large part, the ef-
fect of DOMA.) To the contrary, the record suggests the Framers un-
derstood the Full Faith and Credit Clause to give power to the
national government at the cost of state power. As Professor Sunstein
argued to the Senate Judiciary Committee, "[i]f you look at the history
of the clause back when the Framers were writing-Madison and the
others-they spoke about congressional extension and enforcement of
judgments. They spoke not at all about congressional nullification of
judgments."'0 9
The modern understanding of the Framers' intent upon granting
the new congressional authority echoes Wilson's argument that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause was meant to require more than comity.
The Supreme Court stated in 1948 that the Clause "substituted a com-
mand for the earlier principles of comity and thus basically altered the
status of the States as independent sovereigns.""10 According to one
account,
[t]he Framers felt ... that the rules of private international law should not be
left among the States altogether on a basis of comity and hence subject always
to some overruling local rule of the lexfori but ought to be in some measure at
least placed on the higher plane of constitutional obligation. In fulfillment of
this intent the section now under consideration was inserted, and Congress
was empowered to enact supplementary and enforcing legislation.1 1 1
108. See Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 45 (statement of Prof. Sunstein). The rec-
ord is sparse and thus sheds limited light on the original meaning of full faith
and credit. As Radin notes, "t]he debate of August 29th seems to have exhausted
the interest they took in it. There is almost no reference to it in the debates in
the various states on adopting the Constitution." Radin, supra note 99, at 9.
109. Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 43. See also id. at 45 (statement of Prof.
Sunstein).
110. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
111. CONGREssIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AmrEICA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 836 (Washington 1987). Note how the
Congressional Research Service describes Congress' power in positive terms: "to
enact supplementary and enforcing legislation." This affirmative language seems
to foreclose the possibility that Congress can restrict faith and credit. The same
treatise, however, implies Congress might have the power to do so.
Congress has the power under the clause to decree the effects that the
statutes of one State shall have in other States. This being so, it does
not seem extravagant to argue that Congress may under the clause de-
scribe a certain kind of divorce and say that it shall be granted recogni-
tion throughout the Union and that no other kind shall.
Id. at 870.
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To comport with this interpretation, Congress must exercise its full
faith and credit authority to require broader interstate recognition of
acts, records, and proceedings than the recognition achieved under
comity. If Congress could decrease faith and credit, then interstate
recognition could be reduced to that afforded under the doctrine of
comity. Because DO1A allows states to return to a lower level of obli-
gation, it conflicts with the prevailing understanding of the Framers'
intent.112
B. Madison and the Ratchet Theory
James Madison offered one of the earliest interpretations of Con-
gress' full faith and credit power. His understanding of Congress'
power provides a useful touchstone for analyzing the limits of Con-
gress' authority. Madison viewed the grant of congressional authority
as an important improvement on the original full faith and credit pro-
vision in the Articles of Confederation.113 As he wrote in the Federal-
ist Papers,
[tihe power of prescribing by general laws the manner in which the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the
effect they shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable improvement
on the clause relating to this subject in the Articles of Confederation.... The
power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument ofjus-
tice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where
the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated in any
stage of the process within a foreign jurisdiction.1 1 4
Although Madison did not expressly describe Congress' power as sub-
ject to a one-way ratchet, he never suggested that Congress could ne-
gate full faith and credit.1 15
As Madison's comments about the sudden and secret translations
suggest, he believed that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would have
the beneficial effect of preventing a losing litigant from fleeing with
his resources to a jurisdiction where the judgment would not be en-
112. DOMA's opponents noted this tension between the Framers' intent to demand
more than comity and the effects of DOMA. See, e.g., Tribe Letter, supra note 8,
at S5933; Eskridge, supra note 4, at 11.
113. See Radin, supra note 99, at 10 (asserting that Madison considered the grant of
congressional authority by "far the most important part of the section").
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 278-79 (James Madison)(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
115. Justice Story agreed with Madison's description of Congress' new power as a sig-
nificant improvement on the prior provision in the Articles of Confederation. 2
STORY, supra note 84, § 1303. Story's interpretation of the Clause also supports
the theory of the one-way ratchet limit on Congress' power. He described Con-
gress' power as conferring "additional certainty" on the mandate of full faith and
credit; adding certainty does not imply detracting from full faith and credit. Fur-
thermore, Story's use of the word "additional" supports the reading that the Ef-
fects Clause gives Congress power to implement-not to create exceptions to-
the mandate of full faith and credit.
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forced against him. According to Madison, the Clause would foreclose
such evasion.
Yet, DOMA facilitates such tactics. In exploring DOMA's likely ef-
fects, Professor Andrew Koppelman posits hypotheticals in which los-
ing litigants escape adverse judgments by taking their assets into
different jurisdictions.116 For example, a losing litigant can flee to a
jurisdiction that will refuse to enforce the prior judgment because the
prior judgment necessarily recognized the validity of a same-sex mar-
riage relationship.
If a drunk driver runs down and kills a pedestrian on a Honolulu street, the
victim happens to have been married to a person of the same sex, and the
surviving spouse wins a wrongful death suit, the driver could flee with his
money to a state that does not recognize same-sex marriage. Under DOMA,
courts in other states would have no obligation to enforce the judgment.1 17
Koppelman's hypothetical anticipates the very harm that Madison ex-
pected the Clause to foreclose. The losing litigant who manipulates
conflicting state laws to avoid an adverse judgment flouts what
Madison understood to be the principal purpose of the Clause. In
Madison's terms, the drunk driver successfully "translates" his "ef-
fects liable to justice" to a foreign jurisdiction. Because DOMA per-
mits such maneuvers, it impedes the function of the Clause as
originally understood by Madison.
C. Modern Commentary and the Procedures Theory
Most modern commentary on Congress' full faith and credit au-
thority describes no congressional power to withdraw full faith and
credit. 118 In fact, many commentators call for Congress to expand full
116. See generally Koppelman, supra note 24.
117. Id. (manuscript at 26). Professor Koppelman's hypothetical illustrates the very
result that the Supreme Court (in 1942) expected the Full Faith and Credit provi-
sion to preclude.
Were it not for [the] full faith and credit provision, so far as the Constitu-
tion controls the matter, adversaries could wage again their legal battles
whenever they met in other jurisdictions. Each state could control its
own courts but itself could not project the effect of its decisions beyond
its own boundaries.
Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1942)(citations omitted).
118. See, e.g., 2 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 449 (1858)(describing the
original grant of Congress' power, but not mentioning any power to withdraw full
faith and credit); CYCLOPEDIA OF A&mramcAN GovERmrENT 709 (Andrew McLaugh-
lin & Albert Hart eds., 1914); Laycock, supra note 64; Radin, supra note 99, at 7-
11; Daina B. Garonzik, Comment, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts from a Fed-
eral Courts Perspective: A Proposed Amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Act,
45 E=oRY L.J. 723 (1996).
Some commentators have briefly noted that legislation to decrease faith and
credit may be unconstitutional. See Freund, supra note 65, at 1229-30; Atwood,
supra note 100.
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faith and credit.1 1 9 The prevailing view, then, supports the ratchet
theory. Moreover, some of the commentary also has limited Congress'
full faith and credit authority to the power to legislate the procedures
by which the mandate of full faith and credit shall operate.
For example, Professor Michael Gottesman has argued persua-
sively that Congress should legislate "federal choice of law rules for
categories of disputes that arise frequently in multistate contexts-
rules that would determine which state's law will apply to resolve a
dispute when more that one state's law might fairly be claimed appli-
cable."1 20 In proposing that Congress declare federal choice of law
statutes, Gottesman never suggests that Congress legislate a particu-
lar substantive result through its full faith and credit power.1 21
Rather, he conceives of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as
"provid[ing] a federal means of refereeing disputes as to which state's
law [is] to apply in resolving issues committed to state substantive
law."i 22 DOMA, by contrast, does more than simply referee a dispute;
DOMA endorses a substantive norm by denying the protection of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause for a subset of state proceedings on the
basis of substantive content.
Although the procedures theory distinguishes between procedural
and substantive rules, the dividing line between the two is hazy. In-
deed, it is because choice of law has substantive ramifications that a
Prior to DOMA, Professor Brainerd Currie had suggested that Congress could
carve out exceptions to the Clause by withdrawing full faith and credit from child
custody decrees, rather than requiring courts to "mak[e] an exception where Con-
gress has made none." Currie, supra note 65, at 120. See id. at 115 n.103 ("[Tihe
requirement of full faith and credit" should be "removed altogether"). Congress,
however, remedied the problems that troubled Currie by passing PKPA. See in-
fra notes 134-37. It is notable that Congress responded by strengthening full
faith and credit, rather than weakening it as suggested by Currie. Interestingly,
even as Currie argued for increased congressional action, he stated that the issue
of recognition of divorce decrees is best left to the states. Id. at 90.
119. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 100, at 428-34 (discussing Congress' power to provide
for (1) service in other states of state process in civil suits; (2) direct enforcement
of state judgments in other states; (3) legislation compelling states to enforce
judgments of other states by rendering new judgments; and (4) compulsory recog-
nition by the states of rights created by legislative acts of other states); Garonzik,
supra note 118 (calling for Congress to amend the Full Faith and Credit Act to
extend full faith and credit to tribal court judgments); Russell J. Weintraub, Af-
fecting the Parent-Child Relationship Without Jurisdiction Over Both Parents, 36
Sw. L.J. 1167-70 (1983).
120. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEo. L.J. 1, 1 (1991).
121. Indeed, Professor Gottesman suggests that Congress, if it so desired, could dis-
place state substantive law by enacting federal substantive rules pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. '[Ilt is at least arguable that Congress could enact a federal
law choosing a substantive solution from among those proffered by the states im-
plicated in a dispute." Id. at 23.
122. Id. at 24.
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federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rule of
the state wherein it sits under the rule of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.123 ,Yet, a significant difference exists between (1) a federal
choice of law rule that "drains the dismal swamp of 'the realm of the
conflict of laws'" 124 by establishing a set of content-neutral rules by
which courts can determine which state's law to apply, and (2) a fed-
eral choice of law rule that isolates a subset of acts, records, and judi-
cial proceedings to be denied constitutional protection. As Gottesman
explains,
[i]t would be an extraordinary departure from past congressional deference to
states in determining tort law for Congress to solve the problem by enacting a
substantive tort law .... The mission of choice of law is not to devise a tort
law, but to referee which state's law will apply. A federal choice of law statute
would not be a torts statute, so long as the basis for choice was not ajudgment
about which state's substantive law is inherently more desirable .... The
framers of the Constitution would have been aghast at the notion that Con-
gress could enact a tort law, but they plainly envisioned that Congress could
referee the application of competing state tort laws in multistate contexts.1 2 5
Gottesman, of course, reaches his conclusions about federal choice of
law in the context of tort law, but his observations are applicable in
the context of DOMA. DOMA is a similar "departure from past con-
gressional deference to states" in the context of marriage recognition.
Rather than a federal choice of law statute, DOMA is a federal mar-
riage statute; it expresses a preference for "inherently more desirable"
state substantive law in those states in which same-sex marriage is
not recognized. DOMA therefore does more than just set neutral rules
of the game; DOMA stacks the deck.
D. Prior Exercise of Congress' Full Faith and
Credit Authority
Despite the Constitution's express grant of authority to enforce the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress rarely has exercised its full
faith and credit power.12 6 Nonetheless, two significant trends can be
discerned. First, Congress has never before relaxed the constitutional
obligation of full faith and credit for valid judgments, acts, or proceed-
ings; to the contrary, all prior legislation has conformed to the one-
123. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Gottesman, supra note 120, at 11 (citing Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). As Professor Gottesman points out,
choice of law is substantive in two ways: first, because choice of law will deter-
mine what substantive rules of law will govern a lawsuit, and second, because
choice of law rules may be outcome-determinative. Id.
124. Gottesman, supra note 120, at 1 (quoting William Prosser, Interstate Publication,
51 McH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953)).
125. Id. at 30, 32.
126. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 111, at 870; NowAu &
ROTUNDA, supra note 100, at 319 n.3; WARREN, supra note 107, at 565.
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way ratchet. 12 7 Second, in those rare instances in which Congress has
invoked its full faith and credit authority, it has legislated procedural
norms-not substantive preferences-to be used to fulfill the require-
ment of full faith and credit.
The First Congress exercised its full faith and credit power to pass
the Act of May 26, 1790.128 The statute provided the procedural
mechanism by which the full faith and credit obligation could be trig-
gered, but gave no guidance as to the appropriate choice of law.' 2 9 No
legislative history from this Act indicates that Congress' power in-
cluded the power to restrict full faith and credit.i 30
Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies by its terms
only to states, § 1738 imposes the full faith and credit obligation on
federal as well as state courts.' 3 ' The United States Supreme Court
127. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 41, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2944
(noting that all prior legislation enforced the constitutional mandate). See also
Tribe Letter, supra note 8, at S5932-33; Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 6, 97 n.492 (1996). Professor Koppelman
has pointed out that Congress has created statutory exceptions to the rule of full
faith and credit for "judgments that Congress had the power to declare void for all
purposes," i.e., because Congress properly divested the state courts of jurisdic-
tion. He concludes these examples do not support "a general right of Congress to
repeal full faith and credit for judgments issued by state courts within their
proper jurisdiction." Koppelman, supra note 24, at 35 n.100 (citing Kalb v. Feuer-
stein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940); United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S.
506 (1940)).
128. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738). The statute
stated how acts of state legislatures could be authenticated and how state judicial
records and proceedings should be proved, and provided that "records and judicial
proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit given to them in
every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of
the State from which they are taken." Id. See also Radin, supra note 99, at 10-
11.
129. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
Congress, 61 U. CH. L. REv. 775, 841 (1994); Keith H. Beyler, Personal Jurisdic-
tion Based on Advertising: The First Amendment and Federal Liberty Issues, 61
Mo. L. REv. 61, 120 (1996).
130. The implementing statute was passed without debate. Atwood, supra note 100,
at 66 n.36 (citing Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judg-
ments, 49 COLUM. L. Rsv. 153, 153-55 (1949)).
131. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 107, at 900. Professor Clinton notes that
section 1738 has been given a literal reading that creates certain anoma-
lies. For example, federal courts asked to enforce state judgments are
bound by section 1738 to accord full faith and credit to such judgments
by section 1738. In contrast, section 1738, as construed by most com-
mentators, does not directly impose on any state court asked to enforce a
federal court judgment any obligation to accord such judgment full faith
and credit. Rather, it is usually assumed that constitutional supremacy,
rather than the statutory language, compels state courts to accord fed-
eral court judgments fifll faith and credit.
Id. at 901 (footnotes omitted). See also Atwood, supra note 100, at 67 n.40 (citing
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938)). For a survey and critique of the case law
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has stated that the statute was drafted to "insure that federal courts,
not included within the constitutional provision, would be bound by
state judgments."'132 Thus, Congress' first exercise of its full faith and
credit authority illustrates the two trends described above. First,
§ 1738 conforms to the one-way ratchet by increasing the faith and
credit required by the Constitution. Second, § 1738 sets out the proce-
dure by which the Clause shall be implemented without regard to sub-
stantive content of the acts, records, or proceedings at issue.
Other legislation pursuant.to the Full Faith and Credit Clause has
also enforced compliance with, rather than defused the mandate of,
full faith and credit.13 3 For example, the Parental Kidnapping Pre-
vention Act134 (PKPA) requires states to give full faith and credit to
child custody determinations of other states, so long as those determi-
nations are consistent with the criteria established by Congress. Be-
cause child custody determinations can be modified if necessary for
the best interests of the child, courts tended, prior to the enactment of
PKPA, to characterize such determinations as not final and therefore
not necessarily deserving of full faith and credit.135 The failure to en-
force the custody decrees provided an incentive for a disappointed par-
ent to kidnap her child and seek another custody determination
elsewhere. PKPA foreclosed such manipulation by requiring states to
enforce custody decrees from sister states, provided the determina-
tions were made by states with proper jurisdiction.
Again, the two trends of congressional full faith and credit practice
are apparent: Congress legislated to increase full faith and credit,
and, by linking full faith and credit to a set of jurisdictional criteria,
Congress employed a procedural mechanism to expand the mandate of
full faith and credit without regard to the substantive result of the
custody decrees to be enforced.13 6 Indeed, when describing PKPA, the
regarding the effect of federal court judgments in later state court proceedings,
see Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 744-49 (1976).
132. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483 n.24 (1982). A notable ex-
ception to the general rule of full faith and credit as required by § 1738 rests on
the validity ofjurisdiction exercised by the first court. Section 1738 has long been
interpreted to require states to give effect only to sister-state judgments rendered
by a court with jurisdiction. This "lack of jurisdiction exception" was confirmed
by the Supreme Court in 1850. See Beyler, supra note 129, at 120 (citing D'Arcy
v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 176 (1850)).
133. See supra note 127.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994). PKPA was passed pursuant to Congress' authority to
implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause. For a concise description of PKPA,
see Barbara Ann Atwood, Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses
of Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 1051, 1062-65 (1989).
135. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 134, at 1063-64 (citing Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187,
192 (1963); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 948 (6th Cir. 1985)).
136. One DOMA cosponsor, Senator Nickles, argued DOMA was similar to PKPA. 142
CONG. REc. S4869, 84870 (daily ed. May 8, 1996). As one commentator has
pointed out, however, "Senator Nickles' analogy to prior full faith and credit legis-
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Supreme Court emphasized the procedural nature of Congress'
method of extending full faith and credit to child custody determina-
tions. "Because Congress's chief aim in enacting PKPA was to extend
the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody deter-
minations, the Act is most naturally construed to furnish a rule of de-
cision for courts to use in adjudicating custody disputes .... "137
Congress' past exercise of its full faith and credit power has con-
formed to the one-way ratchet.1 3 8 Rather than withdrawing full faith
and credit from some proceedings, Congress has enforced full faith
and credit for proceedings that satisfy certain criteria. DOMA com-
pletely departs from the tradition of prior full faith and credit legisla-
tion by decreasing the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit
and weakening full faith and credit for a specified subset of state pro-
ceedings on the basis of substantive content. By withdrawing full
faith and credit only from acts, records, and judicial proceedings that
recognize same-sex marriages, Congress legislated a substantive
norm. In sum, DOMA's method conflicts with every prior act of Con-
gress under the Effects Clause.13 9
lation reveals the flaws in his defense of DOMA's constitutionality." Cynthia M.
Reed, When Love, Comity and Justice Conquer Borders: INS Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriage, 28 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 97, 129 (1996). First, Congress
sought to clarify that custody orders rendered by states with proper jurisdiction
are "sufficiently final to warrant full faith and credit," whereas the "finality of
marriage licenses... is much less ambiguous." Id. Second, PKPA
"prescribes the manner" in which custody orders are entitled to full faith
and credit by means of a jurisdiction standard. DOMA establishes no
standard at all, but rather permits each State on an ad hoc basis to de-
termine whether or not it wants to extend full faith and credit to a same-
sex marriage.
Id. Third, PKPA was based on sound public policy by discouraging "child snatch-
ing" and protecting the welfare of children, and "[t]here is no comparable crisis
with same-sex marriage." Id. at 129-30 (footnote omitted).
If PKPA had created a subset of custody decrees that did not require full faith
and credit based on the substantive content of the custody decrees, then it would
have been an apt analogy. For example, if PKPA provided that states need not
give effect to custody decrees awarding custody to lesbians, then PKPA would be
precedent for DOMA.
137. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 183 (1988).
138. Full faith and credit for the Child Support Orders Act of 1994 requires the same
with respect to child support orders. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994). The Safe Homes
for Women Act of 1994 requires full faith and credit be given to protective orders
issued against a spouse or intimate partner with respect to domestic violence. 18
U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
139. See also Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 44 (statement of Prof. Sunstein)("In
the nation's history, Congress has never declared that marriages in one state
may not be recognized in another; it has never done this for polygamous mar-
riage, marriages among minors, incestuous marriages, or bigamous marriages.");
Kramer, supra note 26, at 2001 ("Note how extraordinary the proposed Defense of
Marriage Act is in this light: Congress was content to let states slug it out on
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That Congress has never legislated either to decrease full faith and
credit or to establish a substantive rather than procedural norm is not
necessarily persuasive evidence that it has no power to do so. If Con-
gress has power to make exceptions to the substantive provisions of
the full faith and credit mandate, that power is not extinguished by
Congress' disuse. It therefore is necessary to consider other argu-
ments in support of the one-way ratchet and the procedures theories.
V. REASONING BY ANALOGY-COMPARING CONGRESS'
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT POWER TO OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Given the ambiguity of the Effects Clause, the precise nature and
scope of Congress' full faith and credit power cannot be definitively
discerned from its language. As DOMA percolated in Congress, sev-
eral commentators studied how other constitutional powers had been
granted to and exercised by Congress, and construed by the courts. 140
These analyses suggest the drafters knew how to regulate the scope of
Congress' authority when they so desired. On balance, comparing the
text of the Effects Clause with grants of congressional authority (or
lack thereof) in the Fourteenth Amendment, Article III, the Elections
Clauses, and the Fugitive Slave Clause suggests that the ratchet the-
ory and the procedures theory are plausible and persuasive interpre-
tations of the nature and scope of Congress' power.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Comparison: Unambiguous One-
Way Ratchet Defining Congress' Power to Enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment
The scope of Congress' authority under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is bound by an unambiguous one-way ratchet created by the un-
ambiguous language of "enforcement." In contrast, Congress' full
faith and credit power under the Effects Clause lacks such definitional
clarity. Nevertheless, the ratchet theory as understood in the context
of the Fourteenth Amendment is a useful analytic tool to understand
how Congress' power can operate in one direction only.
The ratchet theory of congressional authority first appeared in
footnote ten of Katzenbach v. Morgan,141 which upheld the constitu-
tionality of § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act. Section 4(e) suspended
English-language literacy tests for persons who had completed the
issues like slavery, miscegenation, divorce and abortion, but this, it seems, goes
too far.").
140. See, e.g., Hearings 7/111/96, supra note 7, at 58 (letter of Prof. McConnell to Sen.
Hatch); Tribe Letter, supra note 8. See also Koppelman, supra note 24 (manu-
script at 30-36); Kramer, supra note 26, at 2001-02.
141. 384 U.S. 641 (1966)(upholding § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(e) (1970)).
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sixth grade in Puerto Rican schools in which the language of instruc-
tion was other than English. 142 The Attorney General for New
York' 43 argued that § 4(e) exceeded Congress' power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the Supreme Court determined
that the English literacy requirement violated equal protection.144
The Supreme Court disagreed and sustained § 4(e) without reaching
the question of whether the literacy requirement violated equal pro-
tection. Instead, the Court held that Section 5 was "a positive grant of
legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in de-
termining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guar-
antees of the Fourteenth Amendment."145
Allowing Congress to perform this judicial fimction of constitu-
tional interpretation seemed to threaten the separation of powers.
The two dissenters, Justices Harlan and Stewart, seized the separa-
tion of powers issue inherent in this rationale.146 They argued that if
Congress had power to interpret the Constitution, then Congress
could "dilute as well as expand the substantive scope of due process
and equal protection."1 47 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
addressed this concern in a footnote; in so doing, he introduced the
ratchet theory.
[Section] 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in the other
direction and to "enact statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and
due process decisions of this Court." We emphasize that Congress's power
142. Id. at 643.
143. Id. at 644-45 nn.2-3. At the time, New York required English literacy to be estab-
lished by passing a literacy test or by proof of completing sixth grade in a school
where English was the language of instruction. Id.
144. Id. at 648. See also William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process
and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 603, 604-05 (1975).
145. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). See also id. at 650 ("By includ-
ing § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applica-
ble to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause.").
The majority opinion in Morgan offered two theories for its decision to uphold
§ 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. First, Congress could pass § 4(e) if Con-
gress felt that extending the right to vote was a remedial measure to cure state
discrimination against Puerto Ricans. Id. at 653. Second, Congress could pass
§ 4(e) if Congress itself determined that New York's English-literacy require-
ments violated equal protection. Id. at 654-56. To uphold § 4(e) under the second
theory, the Court needed only to "perceive a basis" for Congress' determination
that the literacy requirements violated equal protection. Id. at 654-66. This sec-
ond rationale was controversial as it "rested on the crediting of a supposed con-
gressional judgment that the denial of voting rights was itself a denial of equal
protection," whereas courts traditionally made such determinations. Cohen,
supra note 144, at 605. Arguably, the second Morgan rationale "stood Marbury v.
Madison on its head by judicial deference to congressional interpretation of the
Constitution." Id. at 606.
146. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, at 669-70 (1966)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
147. Cohen, supra note 144, at 606 (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668
(1966)(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the
Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate or dilute these
guarantees. 1 4 8
Justice Brennan's characterization of the limits of Congress' Sec-
tion 5 power came to be known as the ratchet theory-the principle
that Congress may legislate in only one direction as if constrained by a
one-way ratchet.' 49 According to Morgan, Congress can legislate only
to increase equal protection of the laws.o5 0 The description of Con-
gress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment leaves no room for
Congress to decrease equal protection. Because the provision recog-
nizes no exceptions to the equal protection obligation, Congress' power
under Section 5 is subject to a one-way ratchet.
The interpretive theory employed by Brennan-that Congress
could never interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in such a way as to
provide less protection than the Supreme Court had decided was mini-
mally necessary-is not wholly applicable to Congress' full faith and
credit authority for two reasons. First, Morgan's ratchet theory
presumes that prior judicial determinations of the minimum require-
ments of equal protection restrict the precise scope of Congress' power:
Congress cannot "restrict, abrogate, or dilute the particular guaran-
tees set forth by those 'equal protection ... decisions.""51 Such deci-
sions act as the "floor" under which Congress may not operate.
No analogous judicial precedent determines the minimum require-
ments of full faith and credit to cabin the exercise of Congress' power.
Nevertheless, this distinction between the Morgan ratchet theory and
148. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
149. See, e.g., Douglas A. Axel, Note, The Constitutionality of the Freedom of Choice
Act of 1993, 45 HAsTnGs L.J. 641, 657 n.101 (1993)("Under the 'ratchet theory' of
Congress' Section 5 power, Congress may only enlarge the individual liberties of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and may not limit them."). For a general discussion
of the ratchet theory in the context of equal protection, see generally id. at 658-
60; Cohen, supra note 144.
150. Morgan is a controversial case, and Brennan's ratchet theory has been criticized.
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAw § 5-14, at 343 (2d ed.
1988)("[Brennan] did not fully explain... why congressional power was so lim-
ited." (emphasis omitted)); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress and the Ratchet, 56
MoNT. L. REv. 145, 161 (1995)("[T]he notoriously vague legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment contains no clear statement either affirming or rejecting
the ratchet theory."). See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 262 (1983)(Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting)(quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205
(1970)(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Criticizing the sec-
ond Morgan rationale (that Congress can make equal protection determinations)
does not condemn the footnote 10 ratchet theory (that Congress may act only to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause). The footnote merely defines the scope of
congressional authority under the Equal Protection Clause, stating that there is
an abstract limit on Congress' power to act to increase, and not decrease constitu-
tional guarantees. Thus, even if the second Morgan rationale is wrong, the
ratchet theory may still be right.
151. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
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the full faith and credit ratchet theory is not fatal to the comparison.
The constitutional imperative that "full faith and credit shall be
given" is fairly straightforward. Prior judicial determination of what
is required by that phrase hardly seems necessary given that the
Clause already requires "full" faith.152 Anything less than "full" faith
and credit necessarily would violate the Constitution. Even in the ab-
sence of prior judicial determination of what the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires, there is no risk that Congress will impermissibly leg-
islate an excess of faith and credit because the Constitution already
requires the maximum.
The second distinction between Congress' power under the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause is much
more critical. Whereas the Fourteenth Amendment has an "enforce-
ment" provision, the Full Faith and Credit Clause has only an "Effect"
provision.153 In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment states that
Congress has power to "enforce" the provision, but the Full Faith and
Credit Clause merely authorizes Congress to "prescribe the Manner"
by which state "acts, records, and legislation shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."
The text of the Effects Clause does not expressly limit Congress to
"enforcing" the substantive provisions of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Professor Michael McConnell has argued that the absence of
an express limit leaves Congress with a broad power to create excep-
tions to the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, stating
that "[i]n the absence of powerful evidence to the contrary, the natural
meaning of these words is that Congress can prescribe that a particu-
lar class of acts will have no effect at all, or that their effect will be
confined to their place of origin."' 5 4
This reading, which locates a broad congressional power in the ab-
sence of an express "enforcement" clause, proves too much. Although
the Fourteenth Amendment teaches by example what the unambigu-
ous power to "enforce" looks like in express terms, it does not prove
that the absence of such express terms authorizes Congress to make
exceptions to a constitutional rule.i5 5 Professor Laurence Tribe has
152. Cf Kramer, supra note 26, at 2003 ("It is more credible to read the Full Faith and
Credit Clause as imposing a mandatory requirement of faith and credit (defined
by the Supreme Court), with the Effects Clause authorizing Congress to enact
whatever national legislation is needed to define and implement it.").
153. See Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 58 (letter of Prof. McConnell to Sen.
Hatch).
154. Id.
155. Furthermore, McConnell's logic may be employed to reach a contrary conclusion:
because nothing in the Effects Clause states that Congress may legislate excep-
tions to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the natural meaning of the absence of
an exceptions clause arguably means Congress may not make exceptions to the
rule of fll faith and credit. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
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argued that it is impossible to characterize a law "licensing States to
give no effect at all to a specific category of 'Acts, Records, and Pro-
ceedings'" as "a general law prescribing 'the effect' of such acts,
records, and proceedings. That is a play on words, not a legal
argument."'156
Notwithstanding the difference between an "enforcement" provi-
sion and an "effects" provision, the model of a one-way ratchet as con-
ceived in Morgan may be applied to the very different text of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. Even though the language of the Effects
Clause certainly is less clear than a hypothetical clause stating that
"Congress may by general laws enforce this provision," the language
delegates no power to weaken the imperative of full faith and credit.
For this reason, Congress should not provide less protection than
what the Supreme Court decides is minimally necessary. With
DOMA, Congress authorizes less full faith and credit protection than
the Supreme Court has held to be required.157
B. Article I[ Comparison: Unambiguous Power to Make
Exceptions to Constitutionally Authorized
Federal Jurisdiction
In contrast to the enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which unambiguously requires a one-way ratchet, Article III ex-
pressly provides for Congress to make "Exceptions" to the mandate of
federal jurisdiction for the enumerated categories of cases and contro-
versies.1 58 It is a contested issue whether Congress may add to or
subtract from these categories precisely because Congress was given
the power to make exceptions.159 It nonetheless is uncontroverted
156. Tribe Letter, supra note 8, at S5932 (stating that power to "Prescribe... the
effect"... includes no congressional power to prescribe that some acts, records
and proceedings that would otherwise be entitled to full faith and credit... shall
instead to be entitled to no faith or credit at all!" (emphasis added)).
157. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires judgments be given full faith and credit. DOMA, by contrast, allows
states to refuse to give fill faith and credit to judgments. See supra text accom-
panying notes 65-74.
158. Article II provides that
[iun all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
159. See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 29, at 348-87. Congress' power can be
said to operate in only one direction depending on whether Article MI is inter-
preted as the "floor" or"ceiling" offederaljurisdiction. ERwrN CHEMERINSKY, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION § 3.1, at 167 (2d ed. 1994).
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that Article III gives Congress power to make exceptions to the Con-
stitution's mandate.
The presence of the Exceptions Clause in Article III proves that
when the drafters intended for Congress to have the power to alter an
affirmative constitutional mandate, they authorized Congress to make
exceptions to the rule.160 Had the drafters wanted to allow Congress
to detract from the mandate of full faith and credit, they could have
drafted a similar exceptions provision to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.16- Because the drafters did not do so, we can infer that they
did not intend to confer power on Congress to create exceptions. 16 2
C. Qualifications Clauses Comparison: Limited Power to
Administer Procedural, not Substantive, Regulations
Two United States Supreme Court cases-Powell v. McCormack
and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton-address whether Congress or
the states can alter the qualifications for congressional membership
set forth in Article I, Section 2. Both addressed similar interpretive
questions regarding the scope of authority conferred by the Constitu-
tion. And in both cases, the Supreme Court interpreted the constitu-
tional provision authorizing congressional action and state action
narrowly: the constitutional power permitted the House or the states
to administer procedural, not substantive, regulations.
In Powell v. McCormack,1 63 the Supreme Court interpreted the
contours of Congress' authority granted in Article I, Section 5, which
provides in relevant part that "Each House shall be the Judge of the
160. See Koppelman, supra note 24 (manuscript at 34). Professor Currie comes to an
analogous conclusion when comparing the oath provision of Article VI with the
full faith and credit provision: "Article IV's explicit provision authorizing Con-
gress to effectuate the Full Faith and Credit Clause arguably strengthens the
inference that when the Framers wanted Congress to implement constitutional
provisions, they said so." Currie, supra note 93, at 171 (footnote omitted). Never-
theless, Currie warns against reading too deeply into the comparison of provi-
sions with and without express grants of congressional enforcement authority.
"On the other hand, as Chief Justice Marshall would later tell us, the last thing
the Necessary and Proper Clause was meant to do was to limit the authority
implicit in other constitutional provisions." Id.
161. Other examples in the Constitution prove the drafters knew how to write an ex-
ceptions clause to allow Congress to alter the mandate of the particular provision.
See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." (emphasis
added)); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. ("Congress shall assemble at least once in
every Year.. . on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint
a different Day" (emphasis added)).
162. This argument may be vulnerable to the attack that the absence of an exceptions
clause does not necessarily mean Congress is limited to enforcing the substantive
provisions of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See supra text accompanying
notes 154-55.
163. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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... Qualifications of its own Members .... "1 64 The Court had to deter-
mine whether the power conferred by Section 5 included the power to
add to the qualifications for House membership set forth in Article I,
Section 2.165
At issue in Powell was a House resolution to exclude member-elect
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. from his seat in the House of Representa-
tives.166 Powell was excluded not because he failed to meet any Sec-
tion 2 qualifications, but because of his alleged misconduct during the
89th Congress. 167 Powell argued for a narrow reading of Section 5,
maintaining that the authority conferred by Section 5 allowing the
House to "Judge the... Qualifications" was strictly limited in scope:
the House could judge only whether elected members possessed the
qualifications set forth in Article I, Section 2 (the "standing qualifica-
tions"). 16s He argued that Section 2 enumerated the exclusive qualifi-
cations for membership, and that the House could not control the
eligibility of members-elect except to administer the requirements of
Section 2. Thus, the House resolution, by denying Powell his seat on
the basis of alleged general misconduct, imposed additional qualifica-
tions in violation of the Constitution. The defenders of the House res-
olution stated that the "Judge the . . . Qualifications" provision of
Section 5 should be interpreted broadly to allow the House to impose
qualifications other than those enumerated in Section 2.169
The Powell Court read the Section 5 power narrowly, refusing to
allow the House to deny membership to a member-elect who met the
qualifications set forth by Section 2.170 The Court interpreted the
House's Section 5 power as authority to enforce compliance with the
Section 2 standing qualifications. The House's Section 5 power to
'judge" therefore is a policing authority to ensure that Section 2 is
followed; it includes no power to impose additional substantive qualifi-
cations on members-elect.
The reasoning employed in Powell is applicable to the debate over
DOMA. The scope of Congress' Section 5 authority is at least arguably
ambiguous. Likewise, the scope of Congress' Effects Clause authority
is arguably ambiguous. The Powell Court chose to resolve the ambi-
guity in favor of a narrow construction and relied on the legislative
history of the provision to determine the substantive content of the
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
165. "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of
twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be cho-
sen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
166. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 493 (1969).
167. Id. at 490.
168. Id. at 520.
169. Id. at 519-20.
170. Id. at 519-22, 550.
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grant of authority. The Court found the constitutional text and the
Framers' intent, coupled with the principles of representative democ-
racy, required the Court to deny the House's ability to impose qualifi-
cations other than the standing qualifications of Section 2.171 The
Court interpreted an ambiguous constitutional provision narrowly be-
cause a broad interpretation would subvert the constitutional purpose
of Section 2. Section 2 clearly states the qualifications required for a
representative. Such a clear directive defines the limits of the House's
authority to police compliance with the qualifications as conferred by
Article I, Section 5. Similarly, the first half of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause serves the analogous purpose of defining the limits on
Congress' authority conferred by the Effects Clause. The first provi-
sion clearly states that "Full faith and credit shall be given." Such a
clear directive defines the limits of Congress' authority to police com-
pliance with the directive as conferred by the Effects Clause. Just as
the House resolution at issue in Powell sought to use its Section 5
power to subvert the Section 2 standing qualifications, DOMA uses
the Effects Clause power to subvert the full faith and credit
requirement. 172
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed whether the states
could impose qualifications for the offices of United States Representa-
tives or United States Senators in addition to those set forth in Article
I, Section 2.173 At issue in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton was an
amendment to the Arkansas Constitution that precluded persons who
served a certain number of terms in the United States Congress from
having their names placed on the ballot for election to Congress.174
Relying on Powell, the Court held that the state-imposed restriction
violated the Section 2 Qualifications Clause, which set forth the exclu-
sive standing qualifications.175 The state argued that Powell did not
171. At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison urged the rejection of a propo-
sal to authorize the legislature to establish property qualifications for members,
arguing that "[tihe qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental arti-
cles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legis-
lature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution."
Id. at 533-34 (citing 2 MAX FAmRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTrUTIONAL CON-
VEDION OF 1787, at 249-50 (1911)). See THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 409 (Alexan-
der Hamilton)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). See also Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 552 n.2 (1969)(Douglas, J., concurring)(citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, CoaMiM-
TARIES ON THE CONSTIrION OF THE UNMD STATES 462 (5th ed. 1891)).
172. DOMA supporters, however, could argue that the interpretative approach em-
ployed in Powell is inapplicable. Powell relied on the strong historical evidence
that the qualifications set forth in Section 2 were to be exclusive. There is simply
less historical discussion of the function of the full faith and credit provision. As
noted earlier, the provision was carried over from the Articles of Confederation
with little debate. See supra text accompanying note 100.
173. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
174. Id. at 783.
175. Id. at 827.
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apply because the term limits provision was a regulation of the man-
ner of the election, and states must regulate the "Times, Places and
Manner" of election pursuant to the "Elections Clause" set forth in Ar-
ticle I, Section 4.176 The Court rejected this reasoning, stating that
"[tihe Framers intended the Elections Clause to grant States author-
ity to create procedural regulations, not to provide States with license
to exclude classes of candidates from federal office."'177
The states' power to regulate the "manner" of elections was inter-
preted to mean states could regulate only the procedure of elections.
Similarly, the Full Faith and Credit Clause authorizes Congress to
regulate the "manner" by which full faith and credit is achieved. A
consistent interpretation of the word "manner" suggests that constitu-
tional authority to regulate "manner" is limited to procedural
regulation. 178
Powell and U.S. Term Limits suggest two principles. First, a prin-
ciple set forth in one section of the Constitution may implicitly restrict
power conferred by another section. Second, a constitutionally author-
ized power may be limited to the administration of procedural, not
substantive, regulations.
The first principle is fairly obvious. In Powell, the Supreme Court
read the Qualifications Clause in Section 2 to be an implicit restriction
on the House's Section 5 power to judge the qualifications for office. In
Term Limits, the Court read the Qualifications Clause in Section 2 to
be an implicit restriction on the states' powers under the Elections
Clause to regulate congressional elections.
DOMA violates this first principle. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause implicitly restricts the scope of Congress' authority under the
Effects Clause. Thus, Congress may "prescribe the Manner" in which
the full faith and credit mandate shall be carried out, but Congress
may not weaken that mandate in so doing. Of course, both Powell and
Term Limits relied heavily on historical and textual evidence, reading
176. The Elections Clause provides "The Times, Places and Manner or holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the places of chusing Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4,
cl. 1.
177. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832-33 (1995). Interestingly,
the Term Limits Court reasoned that the lack of express prohibition against
state-added qualifications did not permit state-added qualifications, especially
when the Framers intended the Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifi-
cations. This reasoning can be applied to the debate concerning Congress' restric-
tion of full faith and credit pursuant to DOMA: the lack of express prohibition of
restricting faith and credit does not mean that the states, or Congress, may re-
strict it, especially when the Constitution contains a clear and affirmative re-
quirement that "[Mlull faith and credit shall be given."
178. The past exercise of Congress' fifll faith and credit authority has been purely pro-
cedural. See supra section IV.D.
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such evidence in light of the underlying constitutional principles of
representative democracy. Any court determining whether Congress
can restrict full faith and credit will not have equally rich historical
evidence. 179 A court, however, will be able to draw upon the simple
but compelling argument that constitutional authority of Congress or
the states must not be exercised in a manner that restricts the scope of
power conferred by another constitutional guarantee.
The second principle is less intuitive. The contested actions in
Powell and Term Limits both involved governmental bodies using a
procedure-regulating provision of the Constitution to import a new
substantive requirement that conflicted with the Qualifications
Clause. In the context of federal elections, the Supreme Court has dis-
tinguished between the power to regulate a procedure and the power
to add substantive qualifications.
DOMA violates this second principle by using a procedure-regulat-
ing provision to import a substantive requirement that conflicts with
the general mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. If Congress'
authority to "prescribe the Manner" in which full faith and credit shall
operate is solely a power to regulate procedure, 1 80 then by analogy,
DOMA is suspect.
D. Fugitive Slave Clause Comparison: (Mis)Reading
Congressional Power into Constitutional Silence
The Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to de-
crease faith and credit. Congress therefore acted in the face of consti-
tutional silence when it exempted one category of acts, records, and
judicial proceedings from full faith and credit. Congressional action in
the name of the Constitution, but in the absence of express constitu-
tional approval, is not unprecedented.
Congress also acted in the face of constitutional silence when it
passed the Fugitive Slave Act to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause.'18
Unlike the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Fugitive Slave Clause
stood alone as a self-executing constitutional imperative and did not
authorize Congress to act to enforce that Clause. The lack of explicitly
authorized enforcement power in the Fugitive Slave Clause, as com-
pared to the enforcement powers expressly granted by other Article IV
179. See supra section IV.A.
180. See supra section III.C.
181. The Fugitive Slave Clause provides that
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws of
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Reg-
ulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may
be due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
644 [Vol. 76:604
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DOMA
provisions, suggests that Congress could not enforce the Fugitive
Slave Clause.i8 2 This is known as the "compact theory" of antislavery
constitutionalism: "the absence of an express clause granting Con-
gress enforcement authority meant that while a compact existed that
bound the states to comply ... , no remedy was available when the
states breached this obligation."' 8 3
Despite this absence of express constitutional authority, Congress
passed the Fugitive Slave Act in 1793. The Act facilitated the ability
of masters or their agents to capture and return runaway slaves.18 4
The Supreme Court upheld the Act in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.8 5 Prigg
is an example of finding authority in the face of constitutional silence.
After emphasizing the self-executing nature of the constitutional pro-
vision,' 8 6 the Court read Congress' power to enforce the Clause into
the constitutional silence on the matter. "If, indeed, the Constitution
182. See, e.g., KEPmrr L. HALL Er AL., &AmucAN LEGAL HISTORY, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 201 (2d ed. 1996); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
Article IV and Federal Powers, 1836-1864, 1983 DU=E XL.J. 695, 702; Paul
Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Jus-
tice Joseph Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 247, 263 n.65. Con-
gress could, however, legislate to enforce the Constitution under the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
183. Aynes, supra note 94, at 71. See also James Boyd White, Constructing a Consti-
tution: Original Intention in the Slave Cases, 47 MD. L. REv. 239, 245 n.13
(1987)(stating that the absence of express enforcement provisions in Sections 2
and 4 of Article IV "might reasonably be read as significant omissions").
184. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850)(repealed 1864). See, e.g., Currie,
supra note 93, at 171 (stating how the Fugitive Slave Act implemented the Arti-
cle IV Clause, which was "silent with respect to congressional authority"). The
Act, with its "lax evidentiary standards, gravely threatened the growing northern
free black population." HALL, supra note 182, at 201. The Act "allowed masters
or their agents who captured runaways to bring them to any magistrate, state or
federal, to obtain a 'certificate of removal,' authorizing the claimants to take the
runaway slaves out of the states where they were found, and back to the state
where the slaves owed service." Id. In response, free states passed personal lib-
erty laws with higher evidentiary standards to impede the kidnapping of fugitive
slaves from free states. Id.
185. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). Prigg was a professional slave catcher who had
seized a runaway slave who was living in Pennsylvania and who had applied for a
certificate of removal under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and Pennsylvania's
personal liberty law. Denied the certificates of removal, Prigg kidnapped Mar-
garet Morgan and her children and was convicted under the Pennsylvania per-
sonal liberty law. For a detailed discussion of the facts and arguments that could
have influenced, but were not addressed in, the Supreme Court opinion, see
Finkelman, supra note 182, at 273-76.
The Supreme Court also found unconstitutional the Pennsylvania personal
liberty law at issue in Prigg. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 612 (1842)("The
clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive, unqualified right on
the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or regulation can in any
way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain."). See Finkelman, supra note 182, at
252-53.
186. The Court stated that
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guarantees the right, ... the natural inference certainly is, that the
national government is clothed with the appropriate authority and
functions to enforce it."187
Although Prigg may be considered more for its historical perspec-
tive on the question of when Congress legislates without express con-
stitutional authority than for its precedential value,i8S its discussion
of implied authority supports the ratchet theory of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. The Supreme Court stated that "the national govern-
ment, in the absence of all positive provisions to the contrary, is bound
... to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the
Constitution... .189 Notably, the Court insisted that the "absence of
positive provisions to the contrary" authorized Congress to "carry into
effect" the Fugitive Slave Clause. If no positive provision stated other-
wise, Congress could enforce the constitutional imperative. Thus,
Congress' power under the Fugitive Slave Clause was subject to a one-
way ratchet because the Constitution provided no "positive provision"
authorizing Congress to do anything but enforce that Clause.
In Prigg, the Court merely read into the constitutional silence of
the Fugitive Slave Clause a power for Congress to enforce the express
and affirmative language of the Fugitive Slave Clause.1 9 0 With
DOMA, Congress has read into the constitutional silence (or at least
ambiguity) of the Effects Clause a power to restrict the express and
affirmative mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It is one
thing to imply congressional power to enforce the Constitution; it is
quite another to imply a congressional authority to subtract from a
constitutional guarantee. The DOMA reading of constitutional silence
is a more radical break with the Constitution's purposes. If the Prigg
the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in every State in
the Union, to seize and recapture his slave.... In this sense, and to this
extent, this clause of the Constitution may properly be said to execute
itself, and to require no aid from legislation, state or national.
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 613 (1842).
187. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
188. Prigg, of course, is a notorious slave-era decision and has been made irrelevant by
the Thirteenth Amendment. While it lacks precedential value, Prigg can be anal-
ogized to DOMA. Congress enacted legislation (the Fugitive Slave Act) to enforce
the Fugitive Slave Clause even though the Clause lacked any express provision
authorizing Congress to legislate in such a manner. With DOMA, Congress has
enacted legislation to weaken the Full Faith and Credit Clause even though the
Clause lacks any express provision authorizing Congress to legislate in such a
manner.
189. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 616 (1842).
190. The Prigg Court's reading of the implied grant of congressional authority has
been criticized by those who believe that the absence of congressional power
under the Fugitive Slave Clause-especially in light of the explicit grants of con-
gressional power in the other provisions in Article IV-should have invalidated
the Fugitive Slave Act. See Aynes, supra note 92, at 74-78. See also supra notes
182-83.
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reading of silence that authorized Congress to enforce the Fugitive
Slave Clause bordered on the unconstitutional, then the DOMA read-
ing of silence that authorizes Congress to dilute full faith and credit is
an even more egregious misreading of the silences in the Constitution.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES BEHIND THE FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
The central principle underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause
is national unification through preserving individual states' rights.19 1
Requiring full faith and credit for each state's acts, records, and judi-
cial proceedings preserves the individual integrity of state sovereignty
for all proceedings over which the state has jurisdiction. 92 In turn,
the nation-through the states' mutual sacrifices entailed by the re-
ciprocal agreement for full faith and credit-grows more powerful as a
unified and operable entity.19 3 The Full Faith and Credit Clause
strengthens the Union as it confirms the power of the individual
states.' 9 4
The unifying purpose of the Clause has been well-recognized.' 9 5
The Supreme Court stated that it "Tuse[s] into one Nation a collection
of independent, sovereign states."'196 Justice Jackson emphasized
that it was adopted to "guard the new political and economic union
against the disintegrating influence of provincialism in jurispru-
dence."'19 7 Unifying the nation serves an enormous practical purpose.
Stated simply, "[tihis guarantee makes our lives in a mobile polity
easier."1 98 Any exercise of Congress' full faith and credit authority
should harmonize with this constitutional principle.
191. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 2, at 34; Laycock, supra note 63, at 259.
192. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 29 (statement ofProf. Wardle)("As the
federalism principle protects the integrity of the states from possible overreach-
ing by the national government, the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects the
states from possible overreaching by each other... to protect and preserve the
position of each individual state and the national government ....").
193. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 295 (1942)("[T]he 'very purpose' of
Art. IV, § 1 was 'to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties... to make them integral parts of a single nation." (quoting Mil-
waukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935))); Garonzik, supra
note 118, at 739.
194. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
was used to "federalize the separate and independent state legal systems by the
overriding principle of reciprocal recognition").
195. See LEvY Er AL., supra note 65, at 824; Laycock, supra note 63, at 259-60.
196. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). See also Williams v. North Carolina,
317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942)(stating that the Full Faith and Credit Clause "brings
separate sovereign states into an integrated whole").
197. Jackson, supra note 2, at 17. See also id. at 2 (stating that the Clause "coordi-
nate[s] the administration of justice among the several independent legal sys-
tems which exist in our Federation").
198. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 11.
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A second principle underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
the preservation of equality of the states.19 9 The mutual obligation
imposed on the states by the Clause fosters equality: when state A
accords full faith and credit to judgments of state B, state A affirms
the sovereignty and equality of state B. Thus, even as the full faith
and credit requirement exacts a cost on the states, it polices their
equality. As a result, any loss to one state is precisely the measure of
the gain afforded by the full faith and credit principle. As Justice
Jackson noted, "[alnything taken from a state by way of freedom to
deny faith and credit to law of others is thereby added to the state by
way of a right to exact faith and credit for its own."20 0 Any act passed
by Congress pursuant to its full faith and credit authority should con-
form to this second principle by fostering equality between states.
A preliminary assessment of DOMA suggests that it contravenes
the constitutional principles underlying the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. This is a conclusion of logic alone, without reference to the
practical realities facing the country: if requiring full faith and credit
unifies a nation of sovereign states, then relaxing full faith and credit
likely divides.201 A rule that all marriages are recognized everywhere
is, on its face, more unifying than a rule that allows states to opt out of
the constitutional mandate.20 2
Before concluding that DOMA violates the constitutional princi-
ples underlying the Clause, however, the reality of the states' rights
199. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 63, at 289.
200. Jackson, supra note 2, at 33. See also Clinton, supra note 107, at 899-900 ("The
obligation to accord full faith and credit to judgments and laws of other states
became a binding federal legal obligation that limited the sovereignty of the
states as a result of their membership in the federal union."); Kramer, supra note
26, at 2006 ("States are required to recognize and respect each other's laws be-
cause that is what members of a federation do.").
201. As Evan Wolfson and Michael Melcher have written,
DOMA has assured a logistical mess arising from conflicting state and
federal acts, records, and judicial proceedings. At least some Americans
will soon be simultaneously married and unmarried in different reaches
of the country. In effect, they will have to get a "marriage visa" stamped
when they cross a state border. Married couples will worry if their right
to inherit from each other will remain valid, or if their right to make
medical decisions for each other or their children will be respected, or if
their family health plan will be in force-merely because they choose to
move to or visit another state. The problems will also affect all parties
having legal relationships with the married couple, including their
banks, employers, creditors, schools, local governments and administra-
tive agencies, and children. The "house divided" produced by DOMA is
exactly what the Full Faith and Credit Clause was intended to prevent.
Evan Wolfson & Michael Melcher, DOMA's House Divided. An Argument Against
the Defense of Marriage Act, 44 FED. LAw. 30, 33 (1997).
202. The Supreme Court has emphasized how ensuring recognition of domestic rela-
tionships is an "essential function" of the full faith and credit principle. See Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1942).
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conundrum must be addressed. Should Hawaii opt to allow same-sex
marriages, Hawaii's interests in having all of its validly performed
marriages recognized everywhere will be pitted against the interests
of other states to disregard same-sex marriages performed in Ha-
waii.203 The states' rights conundrum requires deciding which state's
rights should be trumped. The example of same-sex marriage tests
the mettle of the constitutional principles underlying the Full Faith
and Credit Clause: if the principle underlying the Clause is to unify
the nation through preserving states' rights, does mandating recogni-
tion of same-sex marriage unify or divide the nation? Does reciprocity
preserve or assault states' rights? How can the Full Faith and Credit
Clause police the equality of states that disagree?
Absent DOMA, the states' rights conundrum would have been re-
solved by conflict of laws jurisprudence. 20 4 But Congress altered the
stakes of the conflict of laws question when it passed DOMA. By tip-
ping the balance in favor of those states that oppose same-sex mar-
riage, DOMA violates the constitutional principles underlying the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. First, DOMA conflicts with the principle of
unification by allowing states to ignore validly performed same-sex
marriages. Second, DOMA clashes with the equality principle by cre-
ating two classes of states-one class of states in which validly per-
formed marriages are recognized everywhere, and one class of states
in which validly performed marriages are sometimes ignored.205
DOMA creates a lopsided effect: the integrity of those states that rec-
ognize same-sex marriage is diminished, while the integrity of states
that refuse to recognize same-sex marriage is preserved.20 6 This as-
saults the constitutional principles underlying the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Instead, full faith and credit principles are better
203. See, e.g., Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 7 (statement of Sen. Nickles); Tom
Campbell, Each State Should Be Able to Make Its Own Decision; California Pub-
lie Policy Should Be Decided by California Voters and Legislators, Not By a Judge
in Hawaii, L.A. Toms, July 12, 1996, at B9.
204. A state court, if confronted with a same-sex couple who demands recognition of
their marriage, may have to perform a balancing test to determine which state
interests are more violently disrupted by recognition or nonrecognition of validly
performed same-sex marriages; the public policy exception may be invoked, and
perhaps applied, by those states which deeply object to same-sex marriage. See
generally Cox, supra note 20.
205. See Koppelman, supra note 24 (manuscript at 10-11). Cf. Wolfson & Melcher,
supra note 201, at 33 ("The effect of DOMA is that marriage will have one mean-
ing for a favored class of Americans, and a second, inferior meaning for another
class of Americans.").
206. See Koppelman, supra note 24 (manuscript at 26)("F]ederal law, as amended by
DOMA, only withdraws full faith and credit from judgments in which the render-
ing court recognizes a same-sex marriage, while continuing to require full faith
and credit for judgments in which the rendering courts denies recognition.").
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served when Congress enforces compliance with the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 207
VII. CONCLUSION: ANTICIPATING DOMA'S DAY IN COURT
If the ratchet theory is correct, then Congress violated the limit on
its power under the Effects Clause by withdrawing full faith and
credit from one category of marriages. It is of course true that the
ratchet theory as a limit on Congress' power was never promulgated
until Congress sought to limit full faith and credit under DOMA.208
The Supreme Court, however, has addressed in dicta whether Con-
gress could decrease full faith and credit. In a 1933 dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Stone hinted that Congress might restrict the force of full
faith and credit.20 9 In 1980, the Supreme Court stated that
while Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of full faith and
credit that a State may accord to the laws or judgments of another State,
there is at least some question whether Congress may cut back on the mea-
sure of faith and credit required by a decision of this Court.2 10
The Court did not speak to the merits of this question as the issue
was not before it. But the passage of DOMA has placed this question
squarely in the public and political realm. Although it will be some
time before DOMA is actually invoked, the ratchet theory surely will
have its day in court.211
207. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 26, at 2006 ("Congress should not be permitted to
redefine its terms at will or legislate away the minimum requirements of mutual
respect and recognition it entails-any more than Congress can suppress speech
or legislate inequality."); Tribe, Less Perfect Union, supra note 8.
208. Compare Eskridge, supra note 4 (defending the ratchet theory), and Tribe Letter,
supra note 8 (same), and Hearings 7/11/96, supra note 7, at 42-48 (statement of
Prof. Sunstein)(same), with Hearings 7/11196, supra note 7, at 58 (letter of Prof.
McConnell to Sen. Hatch)(attacking the ratchet theory), and Hearing 7/11/96,
supra note 7, at 24-42 (statement of Prof. Wardle)(same). There are very few pre-
DOMA articles that address Congress' power under the Effects Clause. See supra
note 120. With the exception of Currie, these authors conceive of Congress' full
faith and credit power in positive terms; that is, there is no mention of Congress'
power to restrict full faith and credit.
209. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 n.2 (1933)(Stone, J., dissent-
ing)("The mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as defined by this
Court may be, in some degree not yet fully defined, expanded or contracted by
Congress."). In 1942, the Court reiterated the question when reversing a state's
exception to full faith and credit on grounds of public policy. "Whether Congress
has the power to create exceptions [to full faith and credit] is a question on which
we express no view. It is sufficient to note that Congress ... has not done so."
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942)(citing Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933)).
210. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980).
211. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 306 (1942)(Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring)("Congress has not exercised its powers under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to meet the special problems raised by divorce decrees. There will be time
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In fact, the Supreme Court recently was invited to consider argu-
ments pertaining to DOMA's validity in Baker v. General Motors
Corp.2 1 2 Baker revisited the relationship between the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the public policy exception. At issue was a Michi-
gan state court injunction prohibiting Ronald Elwell, a former General
Motors employee, from testifying in any litigation involving General
Motors as an owner, seller, manufacturer, or designer.2 1 3 The Bakers,
who were not involved in the Michigan case, filed a product liability
action in federal court and subpoenaed Elwell's testimony.2 14 The
Supreme Court was required to resolve whether the Full Faith and
Credit Clause barred Elwell's testimony in the federal action.2 15
Ohio, Colorado, Utah, and Virginia submitted an amicus brief that,
according to one commentator, "appears to [have been] written with
the Defense of Marriage Act in mind."216 The amicus brief argued
that only Congress, not the states, may create exceptions to the full
faith and credit mandate on grounds of public policy.217 The Supreme
Court did not reach the issue of congressional full faith and credit au-
thority in its opinion.2 18 In the context of its conclusion that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause did not bar Elwell from testifying in the fed-
eral action, however, the Court reaffirmed that there is "no roving
public policy exception to the full faith and credit due judgments."2 -9
This statement notwithstanding, it remains to be seen whether Con-
gress has authority to legislate exceptions to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
The constitutional guarantee of full faith and credit should not be
abrogated by statute. DOMA exposes the grave problems posed by the
enough to consider the scope of its power in this regard when Congress chooses to
exercise it.").
212. Baker v. General Motors Corp., No. 96-653, 1998 WL 7072 (U.S. Jan 13, 1998).
213. Id. at *4.
214. Id.
215. In an unreported decision, the district court refused to enforce the Michigan in-
junction on the grounds that the full faith and credit obligation was overcome by
Missouri's public policy favoring full disclosure of relevant and nonprivileged in-
formation. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding in part that Missouri's public
policy favors honoring the judgments of other states as much as it favors the
disclosure of information, and to disregard the Michigan injunction violates the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811, 818-
20 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, No. 96-653, 1998 WL 7072 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1998).
216. Edward Hartnett, Can a State Court Injunction Prevent a Witness From Testify-
ing in Federal Court?, PRxvixw OF U.S. Sup. CT. CASES, Sept. 18, 1997, at 32, 35.
217. See Amicus Curiae Brief for States of Ohio, Colorado, Utah, and Commonwealth
of Virginia, Baker v. General Motors Corp., 1998 WL 7072 (No. 96-653), available
in 1997 WL 414365, at *4-7.
218. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., No. 96-653, 1998 WL 7072, at *9-11 (U.S. Jan
13, 1998).
219. Id. at *7.
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"targeted relaxation"2 20 of full faith and credit. DOMA's clash with
the plain language and the basic constitutional principles underlying
the Full Faith and Credit Clause illustrates why Congress' power is
indeed subject to a one-way ratchet. As DOMA legislates a substan-
tive result rather than a procedural mechanism, it conflicts with prior
acts under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The ratchet theory and
the procedures theory offer plausible interpretations of the nature and
scope of Congress' full faith and credit power. Because Congress over-
reached the limits on its power when it passed DOMA, DOMA is
unconstitutional.
220. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 28, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2932.
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